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ABSTRACT 
This study considers self-defence in its function as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness, as codified in Article 21 of the ILC’s Articles on State Responsibility. The 
study examines the development of this provision in the work of the ILC and considers 
relevant practice by States and international tribunals in relation to the defence. The 
study explains that self-defence has two functions in international law. The right of self-
defence, codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter and recognised in customary 
international law, is an exception to the prohibition of force. In the ILC terminology, the 
right of self-defence is a primary rule. The circumstance precluding wrongfulness of self-
defence, contained in Article 21 ARS, serves to preclude the wrongfulness of potential 
breaches of obligations (other than the prohibition of force) binding the States involved 
in an armed conflict, so long as the breach of those obligations is a collateral effect of 
self-defensive forcible measures adopted in conformity with the requirements of the right 
of self-defence under international law. In the ILC terminology, this is self-defence in its 
function as a secondary rule. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The International Law Commission (ILC or Commission) included self-defence as a 
‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’1 in the Articles on the Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARS), which were adopted by the Commission and 
noted by the General Assembly in 2001. Article 21 of the ARS establishes that:  
 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence 
taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.2 
 
As explained in the Commission’s Commentary, Article 21 does not concern the effects 
of self-defence on the prohibition of the threat or use of force. With respect to that 
prohibition, self-defence constitutes an exceptional right which, when successfully 
invoked, does not constitute ‘even potentially’ a breach of the obligation not to use force 
in international relations. Article 21 is aimed, instead, at precluding the wrongfulness of 
the (potential) breach of other obligations by conduct lawfully taken in self-defence.3 The 
Commission thus identified two functions of self-defence in international law: self-
defence as a primary rule, is an exceptional right intrinsic to the prohibition of force, and 
self-defence as a secondary rule, is a justification for the breach of other legal 
commitments caused by (lawful) self-defensive force. 
 
 The identification of these two functions of self-defence provides a theoretical 
explanation for a recurring phenomenon in practice. For example, it is widely accepted 
that self-defensive force does not constitute a violation of the aggressor State’s territorial 
sovereignty or its right to be free from external interference, even when defensive force 
occurs within its territory. This conclusion can be deduced from the case law of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), which invariably finds that the use of force which 
falls short of meeting the requirements of self-defence constitutes, in addition to a breach 
of the prohibition of force, a breach of the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-
intervention. The assumption underlying these findings is that if the conditions of self-
defence are met, there is be no breach of these principles either.4 But if the right of self-
defence is an exception to the prohibition on force only, then how to explain the absence 
of breach of these principles? After all, the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-
intervention are distinct from the prohibition of force such that exceptions to the 
                                                 
1 The term ‘defence’ refers to arguments put forward by a respondent to defeat on the merits a 
claim of wrongful breach of an international obligation. Insofar as the ‘circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness’ operate as ‘defences’, the term ‘defence’ as used in this article refers to those circumstances. 
On circumstances precluding wrongfulness as ‘defences’ see the Commentary to Chapter V of Part I, para 
2, of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (hereinafter ARS and 
Commentary), annexed to UNGA Res 56/83 (28 January 2002). Furthermore, the expression 
‘circumstance precluding wrongfulness’ is equivalent to the notion of ‘justification’ current in some 
domestic legal systems. In domestic law, justifications are defences which exclude the characterisation of 
conduct as unlawful, see J Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law (Matthew Bender, New York 1987) 176-177. 
The term ‘justification’ will also be used in this paper as shorthand for ‘circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness’. This use of terminology is without prejudice to the debate concerning the classification of 
the international law defences into circumstances precluding wrongfulness and circumstances precluding 
responsibility (or, in the language of domestic law, justifications or excuses). On this question, see V Lowe, 
‘Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses?’ (1999) 10 EJIL 405; T Christakis, ‘Les 
“circonstances excluant l’illicéité”: une illusion optique?’ in O Corten et al (eds), Droit du Pouvoir, Pouvoir du 
Droit: Mélanges offerts à Jean Salmon (Bruylant, Bruxelles 2007) 223. 
2 ARS art 21. 
3 ARS Commentary to art 21, para 1. 
4 See section III.B.1 below. 
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prohibition of force only are not applicable to these other principles.5 Self-defence in its 
role as an exception to the prohibition of force cannot, therefore, explain this 
wrongfulness-precluding effect. It must be, therefore, that self-defence also has another 
function in international law: that of serving as a justification of these collateral breaches. 
In this sense, self-defence is no different from countermeasures. While countermeasures’ 
principal function is that of serving the implementation of State responsibility, they also 
have an additional, incidental function, that of justifying the breach of the rights of the 
target State taken by way of response to that State’s unlawful act.6 Self-defence’s function 
as a secondary rule would be, then, incidental to its principal role in protecting the 
sovereignty and independence of States. 
 
The formulation of (and the need for) self-defence as a secondary rule responds 
to developments in contemporary international law. In the past, the institution of the 
state of war governed all of the legal relations existing between the belligerent States.7 
The state of war ‘wholly excluded’ the law of peace, and replaced it with the law of war in 
the relations between belligerents.8 In addition, the state of war also produced effects in 
respect of treaty commitments between belligerent States. Until the end of the 19th 
century it was accepted that the state of war extinguished all treaty relations between 
belligerents, as evidenced by the fact that peace treaties usually included clauses for the 
revival of those instruments.9 This extreme effect of war on treaties was subsequently 
softened, and from the early 20th century onwards it was thought that the state of war 
merely suspended treaties between belligerents.10 Whether treaties were terminated or 
suspended, the point is that the state of war set aside the normal (peaceful) relations 
between States, be they customary or conventional, and replaced the law of peace wholly 
with the law of war as the normative order governing the relations between belligerents. 
In these circumstances, in which the law of peace and treaty relations were displaced, 
there was no risk that a State’s armed measures during war might constitute a violation of 
its (peacetime) obligations towards its enemy. 
 
The legal institution of war is of little practical relevance in contemporary 
international law. Scholarly debates remain as to its compatibility with the UN Charter 
collective security system,11 and save for a few instances of declared formal war States 
engaged in armed conflict do not usually consider themselves to be in a state of war.12 
Alongside this development, the existence of war as a legal status is no longer a 
precondition for the application of the law of armed conflict, now triggered by the actual 
                                                 
5 JM Thouvenin, ‘Self-defence’ in J Crawford et al (eds), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP, 
Oxford 2010) 461. 
6 See, FI Paddeu, ‘Countermeasures’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law (OUP, Oxford 2011-, online edition [mpepil.com], forthcoming 2016). 
7 The state of war consisted of the situation, condition or status during which the extraordinary law 
of war substituted the law of peace in the regulation of the relations between the parties to the conflict, see 
Q Wright, ‘When does War Exist?’ (1932) 26 AJIL 362, 363. 
8 SC Neff, War and the Law of Nations (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 177. 
9 M Mancini, Stato di guerra e conflitto armato nel diritto internazionale (Giappichelli, Milano 2009) 44; M 
Mancini, ‘The Effects of a State of War or Armed Conflict’ in M Weller (ed), Oxford Handbook of the Use of 
Force in International Law (OUP, Oxford 2015) 988-1013. 
10 See, eg, North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain/US) (1910) 11 RIAA 167, 181 
(‘International law in its modern development recognises that a great number of Treaty obligations are not 
annulled by war, but at most suspended by it’). The doubts surrounding this question in the early 20th 
century were described by CB Hurst, ‘The Effect of War on Treaties’ (1921) 2 BYIL 37. 
11 For a summary of the scholarly debate see Neff, War, 335-340. 
12 See the exhaustive review of practice in Mancini, Stato di guerra. 
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existence of armed hostilities.13 The application of the law of armed conflict, furthermore, 
does not have the effect of displacing the normal, peacetime, legal relations existing 
between the States in conflict. As stated by the ICJ, the law of armed conflict constitutes 
a lex specialis in the situation of armed conflict,14 a statement which implies that the lex 
generalis—the normal legal relations existing between States—remains in the 
background. 15  Treaties too are no longer considered as ‘ipso facto’ terminated or 
suspended by virtue of the existence of armed hostilities.16 While States may wish to 
suspend treaty relations with the other parties to a conflict, this suspension does not 
occur by operation of law upon the commencement of armed action. In contemporary 
conditions, States engaged in armed conflict remain ‘formally at “peace”’, as stated by the 
ILC.17 
 
The use of force in contemporary international law thus occurs against the 
background of the complex web of legal relations binding the States involved in the 
conflict. In this state of affairs, it is not implausible that such uses of force may infringe 
other obligations existing between these States. The principles of territorial sovereignty 
and non-intervention have already been mentioned as rules potentially infringed by uses 
of force. But these are not the only ones; forcible measures may also infringe other 
obligations binding the States to the conflict. One such example are commercial 
obligations, as claimed by the applicant in the Nicaragua case and by Iran in Oil Platforms.18 
The secondary rule function of self-defence, reflected in Article 21 of the ARS, serves to 
justify these breaches. 
 
Article 21 and the secondary rule function of self-defence that it codifies have 
been largely misconceived in both practice and scholarship. The ICJ, for example, failed 
to grasp the role of the plea of self-defence in the parties’ arguments in Oil Platforms. 
Faced with the Iranian claim of breach of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and 
Navigation,19 the United States justified its conduct by reference to the exception relating 
to essential security interests in Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty. Crucially, the US invoked, 
as an alternative and separate ground of defence, Article 21 of the ARS as a circumstance 
precluding the wrongfulness of its alleged breaches of the 1955 Treaty of Amity.20 Both 
the US and Iran agreed that should the attacks on the oil platforms constitute lawful 
                                                 
13 C Greenwood, ‘The Concept of War in Modern International Law’ (1987) 36 ICLQ 283, 295. 
14 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 226, 240 (para 25).  
15 Thus, the Court found that obligations of ‘total restraint’ in human rights law and environmental 
law ought to be taken into account in the assessment of the necessity and proportionality of armed force, 
see Nuclear Weapons, 242 (para 30). Admittedly, the characterisation of international humanitarian law (IHL) 
as lex specialis has been criticised in the scholarship, see: M Milanović, ‘The Lost Origins of Lex Specialis: 
Rethinking the Relationship between Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law’ in JD Ohlin (ed), 
Theoretical Boundaries of Armed Conflict and Human Rights (CUP, Cambridge forthcoming), < 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463957>. Aside from the existence of a normative 
conflict between IHL and other areas of international law, the underlying point made by the Court is 
fundamental: that even if there exists an armed conflict the ‘peaceful’ relations between the States parties to 
it are not automatically set aside. 
16 Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, annexed to General Assembly Res 
66/99 of 9 December 2011, art 3 and Commentary, in ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission 
on the work of its sixty-third session’ (26 April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011) Doc No A/66/10, 173ff. 
The Report will appear in ILC Ybk 2011/II, Part Two (not yet published).  
17 ARS Commentary art 21, para 2. See also J Crawford, Second Report on State Responsibility, UN 
Doc A/CN.4/498/Add.2,  ILC Ybk 1999/II, Part One, 75 (para 299).  
18 See section III.B.3 below. 
19 Adopted 15 August 1955, entered into force 16 June 1957, 284 UNTS 93. 
20 See, eg, the US Rejoinder, Oil Platforms, 141 (para 5.02); oral statement by Iran, Oil Platforms, at CR 
2003/5, 41 (para 29), and at CR 2003/7, 51 (para 3). 
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measures of self-defence, this circumstance would justify the breach of the 1955 Treaty. 
The Court did not address the American argument based on Article 21 of the ARS, 
opting instead to incorporate the law of self-defence into the Treaty by way of 
interpretation of Article XX(1)(d),21 a decision which attracted much criticism both inside 
the bench 22  and in the scholarly community. 23  The Court is not alone in its 
misunderstanding of this rule. While scholars are frequently engaged with the law on the 
use of force, 24  they have rarely discussed the secondary rule aspect of self-defence. 
Indeed, textbooks usually refer only to the right (primary rule) of self-defence in their 
treatment of Article 21.25 Few specialised works discuss Article 21 in its current ILC 
conceptualisation as a defence for the breach of other obligations by lawful self-defensive 
force,26 and of these few there are some that claim the rule in Article 21 to be useless. 27 
  
This study examines Article 21 of the ARS and explains its intended role and 
scope of application. It proceeds in two parts. First, in Section II it traces the 
development of this provision at the ILC. As will be shown, while the text of Article 21 
underwent only minor modifications between the first and second reading, the 
understanding of the function of self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness 
changed significantly between the two readings. From a provision concerning 
justification for the infringement of the prohibition of force, the Article on self-defence 
as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness was modified to concern exoneration for the 
breach of obligations other than the proscription of force by lawful self-defensive action. 
Second, in Section III, the paper explores the intended scope of Article 21 and analyses 
some examples of the justifying effect of self-defence in practice.28 
 
                                                 
21 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) [2003] ICJ Rep 161, 182 (para 41). 
22 See, eg, Oil Platforms, Judge Higgins Sep Op, 237 (para 46); Judge Buergenthal Sep Op, 278-283; 
Judge Owada Sep Op, 310 (paras 13-14), 314-319. 
23 See, eg, WH Taft, ‘Self-Defense and the Oil Platforms Decision’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of 
International Law 295, 557; P Weil and D Richemond-Barak, ‘The Oil Platforms Case Before the 
International Court of Justice: A Non-Case of International Responsibility’ in M Ragazzi (ed), International 
Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2005) 329. 
24 There is now a specialised journal, dedicated to the law on the use of force the ‘Journal on the 
Use of Force and International Law’. 
25 See, eg, A Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, OUP, Oxford 2005) 254; P Daillier et al, Droit 
international public (8th edn, LGDJ, Paris 2009) 875-876; M Shaw, International Law (6th edn, CUP, 
Cambridge 2009) 793; V de Oliveira Mazzuoli, Curso de direito international público (6th edn, Revista dos 
Tribunais, São Paulo 2012) 591-592; J Klabbers, International Law (CUP, Cambridge 2013) 130. 
26 To the best of my knowledge, only the following do so: T Christakis and K Bannelier, ‘La 
légitime défense en tant que “circonstance excluant l’illicéité”’ in R Kherad (ed), Légitimes défenses (LGDJ, 
Paris 2007) 233; T Christakis and K Bannelier, ‘La légitime défense a-t-elle sa place dans un code sur la 
responsabilité internationale?’ in A Constantinides and N Zaikos (eds), The Diversity of International Law: 
Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K Koufa (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2009) 519; Thouvenin, Self-defence, 
455. Two other recent publications address art 21 from the perspective of the right of self-defence rather 
than as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, see: C Gutiérrez-Espada, El hecho ilícito internacional 
(Dykinson, Madrid 2005) 125-128; C Farhang, ‘Mapping the Approaches to the Question of Exemption 
from International Responsibility’ (2013) 60 Netherlands Internatioanl Law Review 93. 
27 Christakis and Bannelier, Légitime défense, 247ff; Christakis and Bannelier, La légitime défense a-
t-elle sa place, 519. (They use the French term ‘inutile’.) For a similar conclusion about art 21, see: R van 
Steenberghe, La légitime défense en droit international public (Larcier, Bruxelles 2012) 128. 
28 To ensure clarity in the exposition of the argument, this study will refer to the ‘right’ or ‘primary 
rule’ of self-defence when referring to this rule’s function in relation to the prohibition of force, and to the 
‘justification’, ‘circumstance precluding wrongfulness’ or ‘secondary rule’ when referring to the rule’s 
function in relation to other obligations. This language should not be interpreted, however, as suggesting 
the existence of two separate rules of self-defence. 
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II. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 21 OF THE ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Self-defence first appeared in codifications of the law of responsibility during in the 
framework of the 1930 Hague Codification Conference. José Gustavo Guerrero, 
rapporteur on State responsibility to the Committee of Experts set up by the League of 
Nations in preparation for the Conference, included the ‘defence of the rights of the 
State’ as a circumstance in which the State could ‘disclaim responsibility’ for the violation 
of obligations owed to foreigners. 29  The proposed defence was criticised for its 
vagueness, and Guerrero explained that the ‘defence of the rights of the State’ included 
situations such as the requisitioning of foreign property by a belligerent State when this 
was necessary for the defence of its rights during war.30 To reflect Guerrero’s thinking, 
the defence was formulated as ‘self-defence against an aggressor State’ but it was 
eventually excluded from the Bases of Discussion prepared for the Codification 
Conference, since the Conference had not been called upon to deal with the law of war.31 
 
Between the 1930 Codification Conference and the next time self-defence would 
be included in a project on State responsibility, at the ILC, the very notion of self-
defence underwent a significant change. In the interwar years, the right of self-defence, 
until then an institution of the law of peace which permitted States to resort to force (as a 
measure short of war) for the defence of their rights,32 was attached to the then evolving 
prohibition of force as an exceptional circumstance. 33  This development was later 
included in the UN Charter, in the form of a general prohibition of force in Article 2(4) 
and its exception in Article 51, provisions which are now accepted to reflect customary 
law.34 Moreover, as noted in the Introduction, the significance of war as a legal institution 
diminished and the continued relevance of war as a legal status is, to say the least, 
doubtful. 
 
Roberto Ago, the Commission’s second Special Rapporteur on State 
responsibility, first included self-defence as one of the circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness in the ILC’s codification project. Ago’s report focused exclusively on self-
defence in its function as exception to the prohibition of force, and the Article adopted 
on first reading (draft Article 34) reflected this focus. However, a few years after the 
adoption of draft Article 34 in 1980, the Nicaragua case, the jurisdiction judgment in Oil 
Platforms and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion highlighted some important 
phenomena associated with the use of force and self-defence in international relations, 
which the ILC’s draft had failed to consider. In particular, that force may breach more 
                                                 
29 League of Nations, Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, 
Report to the Council of the League of Nations, Doc C.196.M.79.1927.V [C.P.D.I.95(2)], Geneva, 20 April 
1927, Conclusion 3(b). 
30 League of Nations, Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law, 
Minutes of the First Session, held at Geneva, April 1st to 8th, 1925, C.P.D.I/1st Session/P.V., Geneva 7 
May 1925, 96. 
31 League of Nations, Conference for the Codification of International Law, Bases of Discussion for 
the Conference Drawn up by the Preparatory Committee, Doc C.75.M.69.1929.V, vol III (Responsibility 
of States for Damage caused in their Territory to the Person and Property of Foreigners), 127 
(Observations). 
32 On this point see, generally, R Lesaffer, ‘Too Much History: From War as Sanction to the 
Sanctioning of War’ in M Weller (ed), Oxford Handbook of the Use of Force in International Law (OUP, Oxford 
2015) 46-47. 
33 See, Neff, War, 303-304. 
34 See, eg, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of 
America) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 97ff. 
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than one obligation at a time and that self-defence could act as a justification in relation 
to these breaches. These developments were incorporated in the draft by the final Special 
Rapporteur, James Crawford, during the second reading of the draft and are now 
reflected in the ARS. Article 21 and its Commentary thus clarify that self-defence has two 
different functions in international law. First, as an exception to the prohibition of force, 
it is a (primary) right to ward off an armed attack through force. Second, as a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness in the law of responsibility, it is a secondary rule 
which justifies the violation of obligations other than the use of force by self-defensive 
armed action. 
 
A. Self-defence and the prohibition of force: The first reading of the ARS 
Ago included self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in his final report 
to the ILC, in 1980, in the following terms: 
 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation to another State is 
precluded if the State committed the act in order to defend itself or another State against armed attack as 
provided for in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.35 
 
Ago explained in his report that self-defence was not a ‘subjective right’, or, what is the 
same, a Hohfeldian claim-right. In his view, self-defence could not be characterised as a 
‘subjective right’ because it was not possible to identify a correlative obligation to this 
right: an aggressor State was not under a duty to tolerate the defensive forcible action of 
another State. 36  This meant that the invocation of self-defence did not entail the 
formulation of a legal claim requiring a specific performance (to tolerate the defensive 
force) from the aggressor State. Instead, according to Ago, through the invocation of 
self-defence, a State was simply attempting to ‘justify’ its denial of a ‘legitimate legal claim’ 
that could be formulated against it. That is, the invocation of self-defence constituted a 
denial of the ‘legitimate legal claim’ of the aggressor State that the self-defensive measure 
against it was contrary to the prohibition on the use of force.37 Ago preferred instead to 
speak of a faculté (or Hohfeldian liberty) to act in self-defence.38 
 
To justify the inclusion of self-defence among the circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness, Ago pointed emphasised what he thought were commonalities between 
them. Thus, he argued that self-defence was a ‘situation of de facto conditions’,39 and that 
in this situation the relevant primary rule was suspended.40 The reports do not explain 
what a ‘situation of de facto conditions’ is; it probably meant simply that action in self-
defence is triggered by the mere existence of factual circumstances (eg, the existence of 
                                                 
35 R Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility - Add.5-7, UN Doc A/CN.4/318/Add.5-7, ILC 
Ybk 1980/II, 70 (para 124). 
36 This is the correlative duty of the right of self-defence as identified by some scholars, eg Č 
Čepelka, ‘Les conséquences juridiques du délit en droit international contemporain’ in Acta Universitatis 
Carolinae, Iuridica, Monographia (Universita Karlova, Prague 1965) vol 3, 44-46. See also L-A Sicilianos, Les 
réactions décentralisées à l’illicite. Des contre-mesures à la légitime défense (LGDJ, Paris 1990) 46-47. 
37 Analogous views were held by some contemporaneous literature, see eg: G Moursi Badr, ‘The 
Exculpatory Effect of Self-Defence in State Responsibility’ (1980) 10 Georgia Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 1, 1; Sicilianos, Réactions décentralisées, 40-47. For an earlier statement of a similar view, 
see D Bowett, Self-defence in International Law (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1958) 8-9, also cited 
by Ago in Eighth Report - Add.5-7, 53 (fn 208). 
38 Ago, Eighth Report - Add.5-7, 53 (para 87). 
39 Id. 
40 Generally, R Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc A/CN.4/318 and Add.1 to 4, 
ILC Ybk 1979/II, 30 (para 55); Ago, 1629th meeting, 9 July 1980, ILC Ybk 1980/I, 235-236 (paras 4-5). 
Specifically in respect of self-defence, see: Ago, 1629th meeting, 238 (para 17). 
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an armed attack). Ago drew a parallel with the state of necessity, but the same can be said 
about, for example, force majeure: it is a set of factual circumstances (external event with 
certain characteristics) which creates an impossibility to perform an obligation.41 
 
Ago was thus trying to smooth the acceptance of the draft article on self-defence 
as part of the circumstances precluding wrongfulness and, by extension, as a relevant 
notion of the law of responsibility rather than as a notion of the law on the use of force.  
For Ago, there was no doubt that self-defence was a notion that belonged to the law of 
responsibility; in his view it was the ‘circumstance par excellence which precluded 
wrongfulness’. So ‘it simply could not go unmentioned in chapter V of the draft’ on State 
responsibility.42 To be sure, he was not alone in conceptualising self-defence in this way. 
For instance, Gamal Moursi Badr, writing in 1980, explained that: 
 
In the new world legal order, self-defense has become merely a defense against responsibility for the 
violation of the obligation to refrain from use of force; therefore, its role as an exculpatory factor calls for a 
more precise definition.43 
 
But this was not a widely shared view, and as will be seen shortly, it met with the 
unyielding opposition of some ILC members. At any rate, it was plainly wrong to treat 
self-defence as triggered by ‘de facto’ conditions only: the armed attack, while an objective 
standard, must also be unlawful. If all it took was the existence of an armed attack, then 
self-defence could be exercised against self-defence, which is plainly inadmissible.44 
 
 The majority of the Commission was happy to accept Ago’s proposals.45 But at 
least two members, Nikolai Ushakov and Stephen Verosta, vigorously objected to it. 
They argued that self-defence was not a ‘situation of de facto conditions’ (and, 
consequently, not a circumstance precluding wrongfulness) and that in practice States 
actually perceived it as a right.46 Moreover, they objected to the implication of including 
self-defence among the ‘circumstances precluding wrongfulness’: that where a State used 
force in self-defence there was conduct which needed justification, conduct which, 
therefore, was presumptively in breach of the prohibition to use force in international 
relations. Yet the practice of States, they noted, seemed very clear that self-defensive 
force was lawful ab initio, it did not constitute a breach of the prohibition of force, and 
                                                 
41 See, generally, Paddeu, ‘A Genealogy of Force Majeure in International Law’ (2011) 82 BYIL 381. 
42 R Ago, 1629th meeting, 239 (para 31). 
43 Moursi Badr, Exculpatory Effect, 1. 
44 The point was clearly articulated by Lord Stowell in The Maria (1799) 1 C Rob 340, 360-1: ‘It is a 
wild conceit, that wherever force is used, it may be lawfully resisted. A lawful force cannot be lawfully 
resisted. The only case where it can be so is in the state of war and conflict between two countries, where 
one party has a perfect right to attack by force, and the other an equal right to resist by force. But, in the 
relative situation of two countries at peace with each other, no such conflicting rights can possibly co-exist.’ 
45 P Reuter, 1620th meeting, 26 June 1980, 191 (para 24); S Schwebel, 1621st meeting, 27 June 1980, 
191 (para 1); F Vallat, 1621st meeting, 27 June 1980, 194 (para 20); S Tsuruoka, 1627th meeting, 7 July 
1980, 220 (para 1); L Díaz-González, 1627th meeting, 7 July 1980, 221 (para 9); J Barboza, 1627th meeting, 
7 July 1980, 222 (para 14); RQ Quentin-Baxter, 1627th meeting, 7 July 1980, 222 (paras 16-17); C Pinto, 
1627th meeting, 7 July 1980, 222 (para 18); S Sucharitkul, 1628th meeting, 8 July 1980, 231 (para 28), all in 
ILC Ybk 1980/I. Note also that some members suggested to give the draft article on self-defence a ‘special 
place’ within the ARS, see, eg, A Tabibi, 1628th meeting, 8 July 1980, 230 (para 21), ibid. 
46 See, eg, NA Ushakov, 1620th meeting, 26 June 1980, 190 (paras 16-17); and later at NA Ushakov, 
1635th meeting, 17 July 1980, 272 (para 55); S Verosta, 1628th meeting, 8 July 1980, 229 (para 10), all in 
ILC Ybk 1980/I. Verosta eventually accepted the Special Rapporteur’s proposal, but Ushakov maintained 
his objection which was recorded in the commentary to draft art 34, see ILC, Report of the International 
Law Commission on the work of its thirty-second session, UN Doc A/35/10, ILC Ybk 1980/II, Part Two, 
60-61 (para 27). 
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was therefore not in need of justification. While not framed in these terms by Ushakov 
and Verosta, this exchange between Ago and his critics pointed to fundamental 
differences as to the conceptualisation of self-defence: as a notion of the law of the use 
of force (the primary rules) or a notion of the law of responsibility (the secondary rules). 
 
As to the formulation of the provision, Ago’s proposed article on self-defence 
used broad language: it spoke of preclusion of wrongfulness of acts ‘not in conformity 
with an international obligation’,47 the indefinite article ‘an’ suggesting that self-defence 
could operate as a justification in respect of any and all international obligations. Yet, 
Ago’s report focused on one international obligation only: the prohibition of force. The 
report thus limited the effect of self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness 
to the potential breach of the obligation not to use force in international relations. In this 
sense, self-defence was rather different from the other defences included in the ARS (and 
from the ARS as a whole):48 those defences were of general application, valid as against 
any and all obligations in international law. In its discussion, the Commission also 
focused on this legal relation only. Very little attention was paid to the effect of self-
defensive measures on other obligations binding the defending State to its aggressor. The 
matter was only alluded to, if obliquely, in an observation by Willem Riphagen. Riphagen 
stated that self-defence could not justify the breach of jus cogens obligations. Surely, he 
said, rules concerning human rights in armed conflict ‘remained valid even in the 
relationship with an aggressor State’. 49  The observation was brief, but it was a 
conceptually very astute one. It raised the question of the (uncertain) status of treaties 
during armed conflict, and contained an acknowledgement that defensive force could 
produce effects on other ‘relationships’ binding between the defending and aggressor 
States beyond the obligation not to use force. The remark went mostly unnoticed in the 
Commission, and indeed it is not clear that his colleagues grasped the issue at all.50 
 
 Draft Article 34 was adopted with minimal changes,51 and in its commentary the 
Commission limited the scope of self-defence to preclusion of wrongfulness in relation 
to the prohibition of force; namely it considered the notion of self-defence exclusively in 
its relation to the obligation not to resort to force in international relations. Arguably to 
justify the inclusion of this provision in the draft (and thus respond to Verosta and 
Ushakov’s critiques) the Commentary also states that, by including self-defence in the 
responsibility project, the ILC was simply drawing ‘the inevitable inferences regarding 
preclusion of the wrongfulness of acts of the State involving such recourse under the 
conditions that constitute a situation of self-defence.’52 But the Commission failed to 
note that the ‘inevitable inferences’ extended beyond the effect of self-defence on the 
prohibition on the use of force. 
                                                 
47 Ago, Eighth Report - Add.5-7, 70 (para 124). (emphasis added) 
48 The rules on responsibility, as Ago’s Fifth Report had extensively demonstrated, were applicable 
to the breach of any international obligation, regardless of source and content. They were, as such, of 
general application. See R Ago, Fifth Report on State Responsibility, UN Doc A/CN.4/291 and Add.l and 
2, ILC Ybk 1976/II, Part One, 6ff, and the current ARS art 12 and its Commentary. 
49 W Riphagen, 1620th meeting, 26 June 1980, 189 (para 5), ILC Ybk 1980/I. 
50 Note, however, that at the suggestion of Riphagen and Vallat the ILC excluded the application of 
draft art 34 to the breach of obligations owed to third States: ILC, Report, thirty-second session, 61 (para 
28). For the comments of these two members of the Commission see Riphagen, 1620th meeting, 189 (para 
7) (emphasis in original); Vallat, 1621st meeting, 194 (para 22). 
51 Draft art 34 read as follows: ‘The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an 
international obligation of that State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence 
taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations’, see ILC, Report, thirty-second session, 52. 
52 ILC, Report, thirty-second session, 52 (para 1); see also at 60 (para 23). Echoing Ago’s final 
remarks to the Commission: Ago, 1629th meeting, 239 (para 31). 
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B. Beyond the prohibition of force: Self-defence and other obligations 
After the adoption of draft Article 34, and before the second reading of the draft, three 
cases before the ICJ raised a number of issues which challenged and supplemented the 
ILC’s understanding of the notion of self-defence within the law of responsibility. First, 
in the Nicaragua case, the ICJ was faced with the question whether the breach of a 
commercial treaty obligation could be justified because the impugned action had allegedly 
been adopted in the exercise of self-defence. Second, in Oil Platforms, the Court was again 
faced with a claim for the breach of treaty-based commercial obligations by uses of force. 
In its 1996 decision on jurisdiction, the Court clarified that international obligations may 
be breached through any means: be they non-forcible (eg, the decision of a domestic 
court) or forcible. 53  Third, in Nuclear Weapons the Court was called to consider the 
exercise of self-defence and its effect on other obligations binding on the relevant parties, 
in particular human rights, humanitarian law, and environmental law, thus highlighting 
that the exercise of self-defence and the subsequent existence of an armed conflict no 
longer set aside the peaceful legal relations between the States concerned. This section 
reviews the Nicaragua and Nuclear Weapons decisions, since Oil Platforms essentially 
reaffirmed the Court’s findings in Nicaragua on this point. 
 
1. The Nicaragua case 
The dispute in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua arose out of the 
use of force, through both direct and indirect means (in the form of support for the 
contra paramilitary group), by the US against Nicaragua in apparent breach of 
conventional and customary international law. Nicaragua claimed that these forcible 
actions breached the prohibition of the use of force, its right to territorial sovereignty, 
the principle of non-intervention, international humanitarian law and the 1956 Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.54 The US in turn claimed that its use of force had 
been in self-defence exercised collectively on behalf of Costa Rica, Honduras and El 
Salvador, all of which had endured (direct and indirect) uses of force from Nicaragua.55  
 
In its judgment on the merits, the Court discussed at length the right of self-
defence in international law. In addition to authoritatively articulating the customary law 
on self-defence,56 the Court also explained the purpose of an invocation of self-defence 
in respect of alleged breaches of international law: 
 
The normal purpose of an invocation of self-defence is to justify conduct which would otherwise be 
wrongful. If advanced as a justification in itself, not coupled with a denial of the conduct alleged, it may 
                                                 
53 Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America), Preliminary Objections [1996] ICJ Rep 
803, 811-812 (para 21). 
54 Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation (US-Nicaragua) (21 January 1956) 9 UST 449. 
See, generally, Memorial of Nicaragua on the Merits, in ICJ Pleadings, Military and Paramilitary Activities in 
and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), vol IV, esp 59-131. 
55 Counter-Memorial of the US on Jurisdiction, in ICJ Pleadings, vol IV, esp 164ff. This invocation 
was made in the jurisdiction and admissibility phase of the dispute. The US refused to participate in the 
merits phase, as a protest against the adverse decision on jurisdiction, see Letter from the Counselor for 
Legal Affairs of the Embassy of the United States of America to the Registrar, 18 January 1985, ICJ 
Pleadings vol V, 408. The Court, in fulfilment of the requirement of art 53 of its Statute, took this defence 
into account and discussed it in detail in its merits judgment. 
56 On the importance of this judgment see C Gray, ‘The ICJ and the Use of Force’ in C Tams and J 
Sloan (eds), The Development of International Law by the International Court of Justice (OUP, Oxford 2013) 242. 
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well imply both an admission of that conduct, and of the wrongfulness of that conduct in the absence of 
the justification of self-defence.57 
 
Self-defence, it continued, ‘removed’ the wrongfulness of prima facie violations of 
international law:  
 
In so far as acts of the Respondent may appear to constitute violations of the relevant rules of law, the 
Court will then have to determine whether there are present any circumstances excluding unlawfulness, or 
whether any such acts may be justified upon any other ground.58 
 
The Court thus accepted the conceptualisation of self-defence as a notion of the law of 
responsibility endorsed by the ILC on first reading: it explained the effects of self-
defence using the language of preclusion of wrongfulness. But the Court went beyond 
draft Article 34, in that it considered self-defence as a possible defence for (forcible) 
violations of international law generally. The Court was actually drawing the ‘inevitable 
inferences’ for the law of responsibility of the lawful exercise of self-defence in 
international law. 
 
In its application of these principles to the case before it, the Court considered 
whether self-defence could justify all of the violations alleged by Nicaragua. It began with 
the prohibition of force. First the Court ascertained whether there had been a violation 
of the prohibition of force,59 and found that the US had both used direct and indirect 
force (through support for the contras) against Nicaragua. After finding that this was a 
‘prima facie violation’60 of the prohibition, it discussed and denied that the violation was 
justified by self-defence because the conditions of the plea were not met in fact.61 It then 
moved on to the other rules allegedly breached. Again, the direct and indirect force of 
the US against Nicaragua constituted a prima facie breach of the principles of non-
intervention and territorial sovereignty.62 In both cases, the Court went on to reject that 
the prima facie breach was precluded by self-defence, since the plea had not been met in 
fact.63 Similarly, with respect to the claim of breach of the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, the 
Court found that the ‘mining of the Nicaraguan ports … is in manifest contradiction 
with the freedom of navigation and commerce guaranteed’ by Article XIX the Treaty,64 
which was also not justified by self-defence.65 
 
The judgment’s approach mirrored the structure of the Nicaraguan argument. In 
its memorial and its oral pleadings before the Court, Nicaragua had discussed, by way of 
counterargument, whether self-defence could justify the various breaches it alleged. 66 
Moreover, it is noteworthy that, despite the limitation of draft Article 34 to the relation 
between self-defence and the prohibition of force only, Nicaragua had referred to the 
ILC’s draft articles on circumstances precluding wrongfulness in addressing possible 
                                                 
57 Nicaragua, 44-45 (para 74). 
58 Ibid, 107-108 (para 226). 
59 Ibid, 118 (paras 227-228). 
60 Ibid, 118 (228). 
61 Ibid, 119-123. 
62 Ibid, 126 (para 247), on prohibition of intervention; 128 (para 251), on territorial sovereignty. 
63 Ibid, 126 (paras 247-249), on prohibition of intervention; 128 (para 252), on territorial sovereignty. 
64 Ibid, 139 (para 278). 
65 Ibid, 141 (para 282) (noting that the ‘justification of self-defence’ had already been ‘rejected on 
the legal level’).  
66 Memorial of Nicaragua, ICJ Pleadings, vol IV, breaches: at 115-129; justification: 129. 
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justifications to the breaches of the 1956 Treaty of Friendship, including self-defence.67 
Neither Nicaragua nor the Court at any point questioned whether self-defence could 
justify the breach of obligations other than those deriving from the prohibition on the 
use of force. 
 
2.  Legality of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion 
The advisory proceedings concerning the Legality of Nuclear Weapons more clearly 
highlighted the existence of interaction between self-defensive force and international 
obligations other than the prohibition of force. Indeed, the very question whether self-
defence could justify the breach of other obligations was discussed in the submissions of 
some States. The Court received two successive requests for advisory opinions on the 
legality of nuclear weapons. First, in 1993 the World Health Organization (WHO) asked 
the Court whether in view of the health and environmental effects of nuclear weapons, it 
was lawful for states to use this type of weapon in armed conflict.68 The next year, the 
UN General Assembly (‘GA’) asked the Court whether it was lawful to use nuclear 
weapons in ‘any circumstances’. 69  As between the two proceedings, over 40 States 
submitted written observations to the Court and many of them also appeared to present 
oral submissions. 
 
States participating in these proceedings addressed the legality of nuclear 
weapons from multiple angles. They discussed whether nuclear weapons were lawful per 
se, and whether other rules of international law may limit or prohibit their use. Among 
these other rules, States discussed the right of self-defence, humanitarian law, human 
rights law and environmental law. In the context of the right of self-defence, some States 
argued that nuclear weapons, so long as their use was necessary and proportionate, were 
lawful when employed in self-defence. 70  As the United Kingdom explained, it was 
‘impossible to argue that this fundamental, inherent right [of self-defence] has been 
limited or abandoned on the basis of mere inferences drawn from other rules, whether 
conventional or customary.’71 While this may be correct, other States pointed out that 
nuclear weapons’ legality under jus ad bellum rules said nothing as to the possible effect of 
their use on other rules of international law. For instance, New Zealand stated that ‘the 
right of self-defence cannot be exercised in isolation from other applicable rules and 
principles of international law’, such that even if lawfully used in self-defence nuclear 
weapons may still breach other rules of international law.72 Likewise, Solomon Islands 
queried ‘what use [was] there in justifying behavior by reference to one category of rules 
where that behavior would violate another category of rules?’.73 Indeed, even if nuclear 
                                                 
67 While it specifically cited draft art 33 on state of necessity, Nicaragua did not cite draft art 34 on 
self-defence. In its Memorial, Nicaragua referred generally to the circumstances precluding wrongfulness 
‘traditionally recognized under customary international law and enumerated in Chapter V of the draft 
articles of the ILC concerning State responsibility’, in particular, self-defence as invoked by the US. 
Nicaragua rejected that the treaty breaches could be so justified, see Memorial of Nicaragua, ICJ Pleadings, 
vol IV, 112 (para 427). In its oral statement, Nicaragua followed the same approach: it referred generally to 
the draft Articles and then denied that self-defence was made out: ICJ Pleadings, vol V, 190-191. 
68 Res WHA46.40, 14 May 1993. 
69 UNGA, Res 49/75K (15 December 1994). 
70 UK: Written Statement, 20 September 1994, Nuclear Weapons (WHO request), 77-81; Written 
Statement, 16 June 1995, Nuclear Weapons (GA request), 37-39. France: Written Statement, Nuclear Weapons 
(WHO request), June 1994, 23-24; oral statement, Nuclear Weapons, CR 95/23, 65-67 (paras 36-37). All the 
statements, written and oral, can be found at <www.icj-cij.org>. 
71 UK, oral statement, Legality of Nuclear Weapons, CR 95/45, 33. 
72 New Zealand, oral statement, Legality of Nuclear Weapons, CR 95/28, 42. 
73 Written Comments of the Government of Solomon Islands, 19 June 1995, Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons (GA request), para 4.73-4.74. 
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weapons were lawfully used in self-defence, they could still infringe humanitarian law, 
human rights law and environmental law. Forcible measures, these States were saying, 
even if lawfully adopted in self-defence may be the subject of distinct legal appraisals 
under different legal rules.  
 
The Court, which found that it had no jurisdiction in respect of the WHO 
request because it fell outside the competence of that body,74 rendered an opinion on the 
GA request in which it addressed the law of self-defence. Even if its comments were 
brief (and in some respects controversial), 75  implicit in the Court’s opinion was the 
understanding that in contemporary international law self-defensive action occurs amidst 
the complex web of legal relations binding on States. The Court described the law of 
armed conflict as the lex specialis applicable in the circumstances, 76  a statement that 
implied that other rules of international law remained in the background not having been 
excluded or displaced in their entirety by virtue of the existence of the conflict. In 
particular, the other rules of international law to which the parties had referred in their 
submissions, human rights law and the protection of the environment, contained certain 
obligations intended to impose a ‘total restraint’ on States during military conflict. 77 
These were obligations that could not be breached, even in self-defence. And while these 
obligations were not intended to ‘deprive’ States of their right of self-defence, they must 
nevertheless be taken into account by States in assessing the necessity and proportionality 
of their uses of force.78 
 
Leaving aside the difficult question of the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and human rights law, the upshot of the Court’s finding is that there 
exist obligations of ‘total restraint’ which States cannot breach even when they act in self-
defence. As held by the Court, a State acting in self-defence is required to take into 
account obligations of total restraint in its evaluation of the necessity and proportionality 
of military measures. But what about obligations of, so to speak, ‘lesser’ restraint, such as 
commercial obligations? The Court did not explain how these related to self-defence, but 
the implication is that the State acting in self-defence is not required to take these into 
account in its assessment of necessity and proportionality such that its use of force, even 
if lawful, can potentially constitute a breach of these obligations. 
 
It is to this question that the ILC turned during the second reading of the ARS: 
could the State exercising self-defence justify the breach of these obligations (of lesser 
restraint) resulting from its use of force;79 or would it be held responsible for those 
violations even though the breach of the aggressor’s rights resulted from force used to 
fend off that State’s aggression? 
 
                                                 
74 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 66, 
84 (para 32). 
75 Eg D Bodansky, ‘Non liquet and the Incompleteness of International Law’ in L Boisson De 
Chazournes and P Sands (eds), Nuclear Weapons and the International Court of Justice (CUP, Cambridge 1999) 
153; M Kohen, ‘The Notion of “State Survival” in International Law’ in L Boisson De Chazournes and P 
Sands (eds), Nuclear Weapons and the International Court of Justice (CUP, Cambridge 1999) 293. 
76 Nuclear Weapons, 240 (para 25). 
77 Ibid, 242 (para 30). 
78 Id. 
79 That self-defence could act as justification for these breaches was argued by Akande in a 
commentary of the Court’s opinions, see D Akande, ‘Nuclear Weapons, Unclear Law? Deciphering the 
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court’ (1997) 68 BYIL 165, 185-186. 
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C. A dual role for self-defence? The second reading of the ARS 
The final Special Rapporteur to the ILC on State responsibility, James Crawford, took 
issue with the understanding of the draft article on self-defence which emerged from the 
first reading of the ARS. To begin with, he argued that self-defence was not a 
circumstance precluding wrongfulness in relation to the prohibition of force. Under the 
UN Charter, in accordance with which the ARS must be interpreted,80 self-defence was a 
condition internal to the prohibition of force: it was an exceptional right which formed 
part of the definition of the rule itself. Indeed, this was corroborated by the fact that in 
practice, as had been suggested by numerous States in the Sixth Committee,81 when a 
State acts in self-defence there is not ‘even potentially’ a breach of the obligation not to 
use force.82 The consequence of this reading, although this is not explicitly stated in the 
report, is that the norm prohibiting the use of force in international law is defined as 
follows: ‘the use of force is prohibited without self-defence’. This aspect of self-defence, 
its intrinsic status as part of the prohibition of force, was not what the ARS should be 
concerned with: the right of self-defence belonged to the primary rules of international 
law and, as the mantra had by then become, the ARS were limited to the secondary rules 
of international law only.83 In this sense at least, self-defence was not a notion that 
belonged to the law of State responsibility. 
 
As an aside, it may be noted that Crawford’s characterisation of self-defence as 
an implicit condition of the prohibition of force was necessary to get around the 
limitation in Article 26 ARS, formulated during the second reading of the draft, which 
provides that the defences are not applicable to the violation of peremptory rules of 
international law.84 Given the peremptory character of the prohibition of force,85 if self-
defence were a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, external to the prohibition of 
force, then it would not be able to justify why self-defensive force is not unlawful under 
the prohibition; a conclusion which flies in the face of positive law and experience.86  
                                                 
80 See ARS Commentary to art 59, para 2.  
81 See, eg, Byelorussia (as it then was), Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 57th Meeting, 
GAOR, thirty-fifth session, UN Doc A/C.6/35/SR.57, 11 (para 42); Ethiopia: Sixth Committee, Summary 
record of the 51st Meeting, GAOR, thirty-fifth session, UN Doc A/C.6/35/SR.51, 12 (para 46); France: 
Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 50th Meeting, GAOR, thirty-fifth session, UN Doc 
A/C.6/35/SR.50, 13 (para 43); Hungary: Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 55th Meeting, GAOR, 
thirty-fifth session, UN Doc A/C.6/35/SR.55, 12 (para 45); Mongolia: Sixth Committee, Summary record 
of the 53rd Meeting, GAOR, thirty-fifth session, UN Doc A/C.6/35/SR.53, 8 (paras 29-30); Spain: Sixth 
Committee, Summary record of the 55th Meeting, GAOR, thirty-fifth session, UN Doc A/C.6/35/SR.55, 
4 (para 11); Trinidad and Tobago: Sixth Committee, Summary record of the 56th Meeting, GAOR, thirty-
fifth session, UN Doc A/C.6/35/SR.56, 6 (para 26); and USSR (as it then was): Sixth Committee, 
Summary record of the 52nd Meeting, GAOR, thirty-fifth session, UN Doc A/C.6/35/SR.52, 14 (para 63).  
82 Crawford, Second Report, 74 (para 298). 
83 Note, however, that the distinction between primary and secondary rules was only ever intended 
to be a pragmatic one, to be used as an heuristic device to delimit the scope of the Commission’s work. 
Indeed, there is no doubt that the ARS include some rules which may be understood as primary, eg, the 
obligation not to render aid and assistance in the commission of a wrongful act (ARS art 16, see its 
Commentary at para 9). Moreover, the very circumstances precluding wrongfulness are, in some measure, 
primary rules insofar as they direct the conduct of States: States, thus, have a right to take countermeasures. 
The primary rule character of the defences is clearly explained in David, Primary, 27. 
84 ARS art 26 states that: ‘Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State 
which is not in conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international 
law.’ 
85 For a thorough review of practice in this regard: O Corten, Le droit contre la guerre (2nd edn, Paris, 
Pedone 2014) 341-359. 
86 A similar conclusion was reached in respect of the circumstance of consent, see ARS 
Commentary to art 26, para 6.  
  15 
 
 While the role that self-defence plays in relation to the prohibition of force was 
excluded from the draft, Crawford thought that a provision on self-defence in the ARS 
nevertheless remained necessary to deal with the type of situation that Nicaragua, Oil 
Platforms and Nuclear Weapons had exposed: that self-defensive force could violate other 
obligations binding the parties to an armed conflict.87 These cases had to be understood 
in historical perspective: they were the consequence of the contemporary irrelevance of 
the legal institution of war (formal war). In modern conditions, States acting in self-
defence were ‘formally at peace’ with their aggressor. Self-defensive action took place in a 
context in which all of the ‘normal’ legal relations which bound the defending State to 
the aggressor State remained in force.88 In practice this meant that in the course of self-
defence a State may violate other obligations towards the aggressor. For example, it ‘may 
trespass on its territory, interfere in its internal affairs, disrupt its trade contrary to the 
provisions of a commercial treaty, etc.’89 And this was the real question: did self-defence 
constitute a ‘justification or an excuse … in relation to breaches of [these] other 
obligations’?90 Crawford thought it did. So he proposed to modify the draft Article on 
self-defence to address these types of situations: the self-defending State was thus 
exonerated for the breach of other obligations so long as the breach was ‘related’ to its 
defensive action and that defensive action was in accordance with the UN Charter.91 
 
Crawford also added that self-defence could not justify the breach of every 
obligation. On the authority of the ICJ’s Opinion in Nuclear Weapons, the Special 
Rapporteur proposed to exclude from the scope of the justification obligations of so-
called ‘total restraint’.92 Namely, obligations like those of international humanitarian law 
and certain international human rights which are ‘expressed or intended to apply as a 
definitive constraint even to States in armed conflict’. 93  The Commission rejected a 
proposal to state this in the text of the article,94 but agreed to refer to the Commentary 
the explanation that the validity of self-defence as a circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness depended on compliance with the rules of the jus ad bellum and the 
obligations of ‘total restraint’.95 
 
Crawford thus distinguished between two functions of self-defence in 
international law. First, self-defence acted as an exceptional right in relation to the 
prohibition of force—this is self-defence’s role as a primary rule of international law. 
                                                 
87 Crawford, Second Report, 75 (fn 592). 
88 Crawford, Second Report, 75 (para 299). 
89 Crawford, Second Report, 74-75 (para 299). 
90 J Crawford, 2589th meeting, 17 June 1999, ILC Ybk 1999/I, 159-160 (paras 53-54).  
91 The idea was not new. It had already been articulated, albeit with different requirements, by Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice in his Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties: he had envisaged a justification for the 
non-performance of treaty obligations on the ground of ‘legitimate self-defence’. Fitzmaurice’s draft article, 
which was not discussed by the Commission and was eventually left out (together with all other articles 
concerning performance) from the draft convention on the law of treaties, was limited to the non-
performance of obligations owed by the State acting in self-defence towards third States. See G 
Fitzmaurice, Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties, UN Doc A/CN.4/120, ILC Ybk 1959/II, 64-5. 
92 This language is borrowed from the ICJ’s opinion in Nuclear Weapons, 242 (para 30). 
93 Crawford, Second Report, 75 (para 301). 
94 Z Galicki, 2589th meeting, 17 June 1999, ILC Ybk 1999/I, 161 (para 65). For the proposal, see: 
Crawford, Second Report, 76 (para 304); see also his remarks to the plenary of the Commission: J 
Crawford, 2587th meeting, 15 June 1999, ILC Ybk 1999/vol I, 141 (para 32); he later accepted to delete 
the proposed paragraph, so long as the Commission authorised him to explain that the word ‘lawful’ 
covered both the jus ad bellum and the obligations of total restraint: Crawford, 2589th meeting, 160 (para 
54). 
95 Art 21 Commentary, para 6. 
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Second, self-defence precluded the wrongfulness of acts not in conformity with 
obligations breached by the self-defending State—this is self-defence’s role as a 
secondary rule of international law. These two functions are, of course, not independent: 
self-defence’s role as a secondary rule is merely incidental to its role as a primary rule. 
Therefore, to exonerate the breach of other obligations, self-defence must have been 
lawfully exercised to begin with. 
 
The Commission was generally in agreement with the approach chosen by the 
Special Rapporteur on the matter of self-defence, as explained in the current 
Commentary, and adopted what became Article 21 in the following terms: 
 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-defence 
taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
III. UNDERSTANDING ARTICLE 21: SELF-DEFENCE AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
In what circumstances, then, does self-defence operate in its incidental function as a 
justification for the breach of other obligations? This section will first analyse the 
intended scope of Article 21, with a view to clarifying the types of situations in which 
self-defence displays its exonerating power. In particular, it will show that Article 21 is 
only relevant where there is a use of force, lawfully adopted pursuant to the jus ad bellum, 
which infringes obligations owed by the self-defending State towards its aggressor. By 
implication, non-forcible measures adopted by the self-defending State against its 
aggressor are excluded from the purview of Article 21. Second, this section will provide a 
review of practice to show that, while the articulation of the secondary rule function of 
self-defence may be new, it is not ungrounded in practice. Indeed, Article 21 is really the 
rationalisation of a phenomenon already recurrent in the practice of States. 
 
A. Justifying collateral breaches of lawful self-defensive force 
1. A justification for forcible measures only 
According to the Commentary to Article 21, self-defence: 
 
may justify non-performance of certain obligations other than that under Article 2, paragraph 4, of the 
Charter of the United Nations, provided that such non-performance is related to the breach of that 
provision.96 
 
The choice of words is here certainly infelicitous. If a State acting in (lawful) self-defence 
does not ‘not even potentially’ breach the prohibition of force,97 how can there be ‘non-
performance related to the breach’ of the prohibition? After all, there is no breach of the 
prohibition to begin with. Wording aside, the gist of this paragraph is that the non-
performance in question must have been the consequence of a use of force. The 
prohibition of force can only be breached through the use of force (direct or indirect as it 
may be), so that a non-performance ‘related to’ that breach must also have been caused 
by a use of force. 
 
 Consequently, excluded from the scope of Article 21 are non-forcible measures 
that a State acting in self-defence may adopt against the aggressor State. A State’s self-
defence against an armed attack may be accompanied by other measures, non-forcible in 
character, intended to aid its defensive campaign. For example, the defending State may 
                                                 
96 ARS Commentary to art 21, para 2. 
97 Ibid, para 1. 
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impose restrictions on the diplomatic and consular relations with the State author of the 
armed attack; it can adopt restrictive economic measures, such as embargoes or import 
bans; suspend treaty obligations, or even build security barriers as a means of defence. 
The legality or wrongfulness of these various measures is different: some are 
(intrinsically) lawful, some are wrongful and some others, still, can be justified. The 
question is: what can justify them? 
 
Measures such as the restriction or breaking of diplomatic relations with an 
aggressor State are lawful. Indeed, as the Court clarified in Tehran Hostages States are 
under no obligation to maintain diplomatic relations, so that the unilateral restriction on 
those relations does not infringe any rights of the aggressor State. 98  These kinds of 
measures are perhaps better viewed as a type of retorsion, which are unfriendly though 
lawful acts which may be adopted in response to either unfriendly or wrongful acts.99 
 
But other measures may infringe the rights of the aggressor State. This was the 
case, for instance, of the import bans imposed on Argentine products by the UK and 
other States (both European Community (EC) and non-EC)100 following the Argentine 
attack on the Falklands/Malvinas in 1982.101 The legality of these measures under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was contested by Latin American 
States, 102  and eventually the States imposing the ban implicitly conceded that the 
measures affected Argentina’s rights under the GATT,103 and under agreements on trade 
in textiles and trade in mutton and lamb.104 The suspension of bilateral civil aviation 
agreements with Argentina by both West Germany and New Zealand as a result of the 
conflict in the Falklands/Malvinas also affected Argentina’s rights. 105  Equally, the 
construction of a barrier by Israel in its own territory and in occupied Palestinian 
territory, a non-forcible measure of self-defence as the Israeli permanent representative 
to the UN explained,106 affected the rights of the local Palestinian population. 
 
Christakis and Bannelier have argued that these measures can be justified 
pursuant to Article 21. 107  But the argument is not convincing, for both logical and 
positive law reasons. Article 21 reflects an incidental function of the exercise of self-
defence: for Article 21 to operate, the relevant measure must fall within the purview of 
                                                 
98 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran [1980] ICJ Rep 3, 40 (para 86): noting that States 
have the power to ‘break off diplomatic relations’. As such, restrictions on those relations cannot be a 
breach of international law. See K Trapp, State Responsibility for International Terrorism (OUP, Oxford 2011) 
184 (fn 5). 
99 Commentary to Chapter II of Part III of the ARS, para 3. On retorsion see generally T Giegerich, 
‘Retorsion’ in R Wolfrum (ed), Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (OUP, Oxford 2011-, 
online edition [mpepil.com]). 
100 Keesing’s (1982) 31532. 
101 Id. 
102 OAS, Resolution I on the Serious Situation in the South Atlantic, Second Plenary session of the 
Twentieth meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 28 April 1982, (1982) 21 ILM 669, at 
670-1. 
103 Joint Communiqué (EC, Canada, Australia), on Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied 
for Non Economic Reasons, GATT Doc. L/5319/Rev.1 at para 1b. 
104 Sicilianos, Réactions décentralisées, 163-164; C Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in 
International Law (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 215.  
105 Keesing’s (1982) 31533. 
106 Statement of Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations, General Assembly, 
Summary Record of the 21st Meeting, GAOR tenth emergency special session, 20 October 2003, UN Doc 
A/ES-10/PV.21, 6. 
107 Christakis and Bannelier, Légitime défense, 253; Christakis and Bannelier, La légitime défense a-t-
elle sa place, 528. Indeed, they argue that this is the only possible role of art 21. 
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the right of self-defence, codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. The right of self-
defence is an exception to the prohibition of force, so that if the prohibition is limited to 
military force (direct or indirect as it may be) then the exception must be about the use of 
military force as well: the whole point of an exception is to exclude the application of the 
(general) rule from conduct which would otherwise fall within the domain of that 
(general) rule.108 Consequently, if the right of self-defence (the primary rule) is limited to 
permitting uses of force,109 then Article 21 must of necessity concern uses of force. As a 
result, non-forcible unlawful measures against aggressors are excluded from its scope. 
 
This conclusion is corroborated by the practice of States and the case-law of 
international tribunals. In the examples given above, for instance, States did not actually 
rely on self-defence to justify the infringement of the aggressor’s rights by their non-
forcible measures. Australia, Canada and the EC States adopted import bans against 
Argentina in 1982, following the invasion of the Falklands/Malvinas; these measures, as 
the States adopting them recognised, constituted infringements of the rights of Argentina 
under the GATT and under other WTO-covered treaties. In a joint communiqué, these 
Stats justified the infringement of Argentina’s rights under the GATT by reference to the 
exception in GATT Article XXI.110 The language of the communiqué was, to be sure, 
vague as these States spoke of justification based on ‘their inherent right of which article 
XXI of the General Agreement is a reflection’. This language thus suggested that the 
ground of justification was not based on Article XXI itself, but rather on an unidentified 
norm of customary law.111 In addition, the breach of the other WTO-covered treaties 
could not be justified under Article XXI, so the justification for that infringement 
required a renvoi to customary law as well.112 In analysing these examples, some scholars 
have argued that the customary ground of justification at issue was (collective) self-
defence.113 Nevertheless, these States did not, at any point, invoke self-defence in relation 
to the import bans, even though the UK had invoked this right in support of its military 
reaction against the Argentine invasion.114 Only a statement by the Canadian Secretary of 
State for External Affairs in the Commons came close to an invocation of collective self-
defence.115 It seems, rather, that the customary justification relied on by these States was 
countermeasures: Belgium (speaking on behalf of the EC) appeared to rely on this 
notion.116 
 
                                                 
108 D Unterhalter, ‘Allocating the Burden of Proof in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’ (2009) 
42 Cornell International Law Journal 209, 212-213. See generally, GL Williams, ‘The Logic of 
“Exceptions”’ (1988) 47 CLJ 261. 
109 See, eg, Sicilianos, Réactions décentralisées, 293-294; I Scobbie, ‘Smoke, Mirrors and Killer 
Whales: The International Court’s Opinion on the Israeli Barrier Wall’ (2004) 5 German Law Journal 1107, 
1128-1129; T Gazzini, The Changing Rules on the Use of Force in International Law (Manchester University Press, 
Manchester 2005) 129; Y Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-defence (5th edn, CUP, Cambridge 2012) 242 
(describing self-defence as ‘lawful counter-force’). 
110 Joint Communiqué (EC, Canada, Australia), on Trade Restrictions Affecting Argentina Applied 
for Non Economic Reasons, GATT Doc. L/5319/Rev.1 at para 1b. 
111 See Tams, Enforcing, 216; M Dawidowicz, Public Law Enforcement,  371. 
112 Id. 
113 Eg JL Dewost, ‘La Communauté, les Dix et les “sanctions” contre l’Argentine - De la crise 
iranienne à la crise des Malouines’ (1982) 28 Annuaire Français de droit international 215, 231; Dawidowicz, 
‘Public Law Enforcement without Public Law Safeguards? An Analysis of State Practice on Third-Party 
Countermeasures and Their Relationship to the UN Security Council’ (2006) 77 BYIL 333, 373-374. 
114 Tams, Enforcing, 216; EK Proukaki, The Problem of Enforcement in International Law (Routledge, 
London 2011) 160. 
115 A de Mestral, ‘Canadian Practice in International Law during 1982’ (1983) 21 Canadian Yearbook 
of International Law 327, 337 
116 UN Doc S/PV.2363, 23 May 1982, 12 (paras 131-132). 
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Also in the context of the Falklands/Malvinas war, both West Germany and 
New Zealand had suspended bilateral aviation agreements with Argentina; suspensions 
which were understood to infringe the rights of Argentina.117 Again, self-defence was not 
relied upon as justification. West Germany, for instance, invoked the right of suspension 
inherent in the bilateral aviation agreement with Argentina.118 
 
As to international case-law, in Nicaragua the Court excluded the possibility that 
the economic embargo imposed by the US against Nicaragua might be justified as a 
measure of self-defence.119 While in relation to the various violations caused by the US 
forcible measures self-defence (including violations of the 1956 Treaty of Amity) was an 
available though unsuccessful justification, 120  the Court discussed the legality of the 
embargo exclusively under the 1956 Treaty of Friendship and its essential security 
exception.121 In Palestinian Wall, Israel had argued before the GA that the construction of 
the wall was ‘consistent with Article 51’ of the UN Charter.122 In particular, Israel argued 
that if the right of self-defence allowed the use of force against an aggressor (in the case, 
terrorist attacks), then surely it also allowed the use of non-forcible measures to that 
end.123 The Court did not address this point in its Opinion, having rejected that Israel 
was entitled to exercise self-defence to begin with. However, Judge Higgins clarified in 
her separate opinion that the right of self-defence does not extend to non-forcible 
measures such as the construction of the wall.124 
 
As this brief review shows, States often adopt non-forcible measures against their 
aggressors, measures which can be either (intrinsically) lawful or constitute infringements 
of the rights of the aggressor. The notion of self-defence may not provide a basis to 
justify such the measures’ infringement of rights of the aggressor State. But this does not 
mean that the measures will always be unlawful. As evidenced by the practice mentioned, 
States have at their disposal at least two mechanisms to address the (il)legality of their 
measures. Firstly, according to the ILC’s Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflict on 
Treaties, a State acting in self-defence can suspend ‘in whole or in part the operation of a 
treaty to which it is a Party insofar as that operation is incompatible with the exercise of’ 
the right of self-defence,125 an entitlement which is broader than that allowed to the 
aggressor State.126 Whether armed conflict does, in itself, constitute a customary ground 
for the suspension of treaties remains in dispute and the ILC’s Articles on the matter are 
not considered to reflect customary law.127 However, the actual existence of an armed 
                                                 
117 Keesing’s (1982) 31533. 
118 H Lindemann, ‘Die Völkerrechtliche Praxis der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Jahr 1982’ (1984) 
44 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 495, 557-8. 
119 Nicaragua, 138 (para 276). 
120 As noted above, in Section II.B.1. 
121 Nicaragua, 141 (para 282). Note that it is in that same paragraph, that the Court rejected the plea 
of self-defence in relation to the breach of the 1956 Treaty by forcible measures (eg, the mining and attack 
of Nicaraguan waters and ports). 
122 Statement of Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations, A/ES-10/PV.21, 6. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory [2004] ICJ Rep 136, 
Judge Higgins Sep Op, 215-216 (para 35). 
125 Draft Articles on the Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties (n 15), art 14 and Commentary. 
126 Art 15 of the Draft Articles and Commentary (n 15), stating that an aggressor State ‘shall not 
terminate or withdraw from a treaty or suspend its operation as a consequence of an armed conflict that 
results from the act of aggression if the effect would be to the benefit of that State.’ 
127 Y Ronen, ‘Treaties and Armed Conflict’, (2013) Hebrew University of Jerusalem Research Paper 
No 01-13 (January 2013), section 2, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2197704>. The paper will appear in: C 
Tams et al (eds), Research Handbook on the Law of Treaties (Elgar, London, forthcoming). Cf Mancini, Stato di 
guerra, 305-306. Contrast, in this connection, the ICJ’s acceptance that the 1955 Iran-US Treaty of Amity 
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conflict could constitute a relevant factual situation giving rise to other customary 
grounds of suspension, such as fundamental change of circumstances or impossibility of 
performance. 128  That an armed conflict may give rise to a fundamental change of 
circumstances was accepted by Court of Justice of the European Communities in the 
1998 Racke case. 129  Equally, Ethiopia relied on the ‘fundamental transformation of 
circumstances’ caused by the armed conflict to support its contention that an agreement 
regarding pensions with Eritrea had terminated. 130  Secondly, States may rely on the 
notion of countermeasures as justification for these acts,131 as evidenced by the practice 
in relation to Argentina during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict.132 
 
Article 21 was not intended to expand the content of the right of self-defence 
pursuant to Article 51 of the UN Charter. It merely provides for an incidental function 
of self-defence in international relations, so that it can display its justificatory effects only 
where the actual force is adopted in accordance with the relevant rules of the jus ad bellum. 
Measures not covered by the jus ad bellum or unlawful under that body of law may not, 
therefore, be justified under Article 21. 
 
2. The breach of obligations through force 
Article 21, then, concerns exclusively forcible measures. The provision is not, however, a 
simple confirmation of the legality of action adopted under the relevant customary and 
conventional law (Article 51 of the Charter). Self-defensive action, which complies with 
the requirements of the relevant primary rules, is lawful and does not need further 
justification. 133  If this were the purpose of Article 21, then it would be at best a 
redundant provision. 
  
 It is not uncommon in international law that a given conduct may be the subject 
of appraisal under different, sometimes conflicting, legal norms. This phenomenon was 
evidenced by the Southern Bluefin Tuna dispute between Australia and New Zealand, on 
one side, and Japan, on the other. One of the questions posed to the Tribunal established 
under the Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in that 
case was whether the dispute between those States, which concerned Japanese 
                                                                                                                                            
remained in force in Oil Platforms with the decision of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in Final 
Award – Pensions (Eritrea’s Claims 15, 19 & 23), 19 December 2005, <www.pca-cpa.org>. The Commission 
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128 The parties could not rely on the analogous grounds in the VCLT, since pursuant to Art 73 the 
VCLT is not applicable to situations of armed conflict. On this question, see K Bannelier, ‘Les effets des 
conflits armés sur les traités: et si la Convention de Vienne et le droit de la responsabilité suffisaient?’ in O 
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131 Scobbie, Killer Whales, 1129; Christakis and Bannelier, Légitime défense, 253; and Christakis and 
Bannelier, La légitime défense a-t-elle sa place, 528. 
132 Indeed, scholars have analysed these instances as part of the law of countermeasures, eg: David, 
Sanctions économiques, 160ff; Sicilianos, Réactions décentralisées, 262; Tams, Enforcing, 216; 
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overfishing of Southern Bluefin tuna, arose under UNCLOS or under the Convention 
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) between those three States.134 
Japan argued that its conduct was regulated only by the CCSBT, whereas the applicant 
States argued that the conduct was regulated by both the CCSBT and UNCLOS. The 
Tribunal sided with the applicants, holding that it was common in ‘international law and 
State practice for more than one treaty to bear upon a particular dispute’ and that, 
accordingly, there was no reason why a given act of a State may not constitute a breach 
of obligations under more than one treaty, especially since there was ‘frequently a 
parallelism of treaties’ in international law.135 What is more, these parallel obligations may 
lead to distinct legal appraisals: State conduct could be lawful pursuant to one rule of 
international law but unlawful under another, as the Annex VII arbitral tribunal 
acknowledged in the MOX Plant dispute136 and by the ICJ in Croatia v Serbia. The Court’s 
statement in Croatia v Serbia is especially clear in this regard: ‘There can be no doubt that, 
as a general rule, a particular act may be perfectly lawful under one body of legal rules 
and unlawful under another.’137 
 
The existence of parallel and sometimes conflicting obligations has been at the 
core of the fragmentation debate.138 Even though conflicting obligations may be the by-
product of strategically devised policies of States,139 they are more often than not simply 
the consequence of international law’s development through a process of ‘accretion and 
cumulation’ rather than erosion and reduction, as explained by the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
Tribunal.140 The upshot is that an act of a State may be in breach of multiple obligations 
at the same time, or be in breach of some but not other obligations. This is true whether 
the act in question is a non-forcible one (like Japan’s extra-quota fishing of Southern 
Bluefin tuna) or a forcible one. 
 
State acts taking the form of a use of force may, as well, affect multiple 
obligations of the acting State.141 Since the existence of an armed conflict does not have 
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the effect of setting aside the obligations, customary or conventional, binding on the 
parties to the conflict it becomes possible for forcible measure to breach, at one and the 
same time, obligations beyond the prohibition of force. This was implicit in the ICJ’s 
Nicaragua judgment, and was later upheld in no uncertain terms in the Oil Platforms case. 
In Oil Platforms, Iran’s claim concerned the breach of the 1955 Treaty of Amity through 
the forcible attacks on, and destruction of, Iranian offshore oil facilities. Before the Court, 
the US had presented an argument to the effect that the Treaty could not be breached 
through the use of force,142 to which the Court replied that: 
 
The Treaty of 1955 imposes on each of the Parties various obligations on a variety of matters. Any action 
by one of the Parties that is incompatible with those obligations is unlawful, regardless of the means by 
which it is brought about. A violation of the rights of one party under the Treaty by means of the use of 
force is as unlawful as would be a violation by administrative decision or by any other means.143 
 
In short: in addition to constituting a possible infringement of the prohibition of force, a 
military measure can also constitute an infringement of a treaty commitment, such as the 
1955 Treaty of Amity between the US and Iran. 
 
 This conclusion—that force may breach multiple obligations at once—has 
underpinned subsequent disputes submitted to the ICJ and other arbitral tribunals. In the 
majority of disputes concerning the use of force brought to the ICJ, applicant States have 
claimed that by the use of force the respondent has breached the prohibition of force as 
well as the principles of non-intervention and territorial sovereignty. Occasionally, the 
breach of other obligations, conventional or customary, was also claimed. These claims 
are briefly reviewed here in chronological order.144 
  
Nicaragua’s applications against Costa Rica145 and Honduras,146 arising out of the 
same circumstances at the origin of the Nicaragua case, maintained that through the use 
of force respondents had breached the prohibition of force, and the principles of non-
intervention and territorial sovereignty. An identical claim of breach of these obligations 
was presented by Cameroon in Cameroon v Nigeria in relation to Nigeria’s military 
presence in the Bakassi Peninsula and Lake Chad, areas over which Cameroon claimed 
title.147 In Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988, in addition to the breach of these obligations,148 
                                                 
142 In general, see US Memorial on Preliminary Objection, Oil Platforms, 50-53; US statement, CR 
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Iran claimed that the shooting down of an Iranian civil aircraft flying over Iranian 
airspace by a US military vessel constituted a breach of the Chicago Convention on Civil 
Aviation and of the 1955 Treaty of Amity,149 the latter of which Iran invoked again in the 
Oil Platforms case dealt with in more detail below.  
 
Almost all of the proceedings instituted before the ICJ in 1999 concerned the use 
of force by States. The Aerial Incident of 10 August 1999 concerned the shooting down of a 
Pakistani military aircraft flying on Indian airspace by India’s air forces plane. In its 
application, Pakistan claimed that this action by India violated the prohibition of force 
under the UN Charter and customary law, its territorial sovereignty and a 1961 bilateral 
treaty on Prevention of Air Space Violations.150 The Legality of Use of Force cases, between 
the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and ten North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (‘NATO’) member States, concerned alleged violations of multiple 
international legal rules by NATO’s airborne military campaign of February and March 
1999. The FRY argued that the campaign infringed a number of customary law 
obligations, including the prohibition of force, the principles of non-intervention and 
territorial sovereignty, various obligations arising under the law of armed conflict, 
environmental law, human rights, and the obligation to respect freedom of navigation on 
international rivers, as well as the respondents’ obligations under the Genocide 
Convention.151 While none of the cases reached the merits, it should be noted that in the 
preliminary stages of the case neither the parties nor the Court disputed that in principle 
the use of force could breach the obligations at the heart of the claims. Even in respect 
of genocide, it was held that in the presence of the requisite genocidal intent an aerial 
bombardment could constitute a breach of the prohibition to engage in this crime.152 
Also in 1999, the DRC instituted proceedings against Burundi, 153  Rwanda 154  and 
Uganda,155 arising out of the armed conflict which had ravaged the region for many years. 
In all cases, the DRC claimed breaches of the obligation of non-use of force and the 
principles of non-intervention and territorial sovereignty. The case against Burundi was 
withdrawn,156 and the ICJ found it lacked jurisdiction in the case against Rwanda.157 The 
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case against Uganda, which proceeded to the merits, will be addressed in more detail 
below. 
 
 The breach of multiple obligations through forcible means is also at issue in two 
cases currently pending before the ICJ: in Certain Activities between Costa Rica and 
Nicaragua (now joined with the Nicaraguan claim against Costa Rica for alleged 
violations of sovereign rights) 158 and in Nicaragua v Colombia. Both cases concern the 
conduct adopted by the respective respondents, Nicaragua and Colombia, following ICJ 
boundary decisions adverse to them. The pleadings in neither case are publicly available 
as the proceedings are on-going. Costa Rica’s application in Certain Activities details that 
by the sending of troops into its territory, Nicaragua is in breach of the prohibition of 
force and of Costa Rica’s territorial sovereignty recognised under customary law and 
under the Charters of the UN and the Organization of American States.159 Costa Rica’s 
memorial, quoted by the Court in its order on counter-claims, also claims that these 
forcible measures constitute a breach of the right of Costa Ricans to free navigation.160 In 
turn, Nicaragua claims that the activities of the Colombian navy near the boundary area 
violated the prohibition of force, Nicaraguan sovereignty over its maritime zones and 
Nicaragua’s rights under UNCLOS and customary law.161 
 
 Similar claims have been presented to other tribunals as well. In Guyana v 
Suriname, Guyana claimed, and the UNCLOS Annex VII Tribunal upheld,162 that the 
threat of force on the CGX rig by the navy of Suriname constituted a breach of the 
prohibition of force under customary law and the UN Charter and a breach of the 
obligation enshrined in Article 279 of UNCLOS to solve disputes peacefully. 163  The 
obligation to solve disputes peacefully was, according to both Guyana and the Court, not 
‘subsumed’ by the prohibition of force but ‘possesse[d] a specific substance of its own’:164 
that is, it is an obligation distinct from the prohibition of force which was breached 
through forcible means. 
 
3. ‘Collateral breaches’ of lawful self-defensive force 
The brief review in the preceding section highlights that disputes about the violation of 
international obligations through the use of force are very common between States, and 
ever-present in the docket of the ICJ. Now, if the forcible measure is one adopted in self-
defence, and which complies with the requirements of the relevant primary rules (a 
previous armed attack, necessity and proportionality),165 can it still constitute a breach of, 
say, a Treaty of Amity or of the prohibition of intervention? As highlighted by the MOX 
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Plant Annex VII Tribunal, multiple international legal rules can be applicable to the same 
conduct potentially leading to different legal appraisals. So, in a sense, a lawful use of 
self-defensive force may still produce ‘collateral’ breaches of obligations owed by that 
State to its aggressor. It is precisely these collateral breaches that Article 21 seeks to 
justify. In the next section, some examples from the practice of States will be reviewed to 
show that this wrongfulness-precluding effect of collateral breaches is one that seems to 
be generally accepted. 
 
B. Self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in practice 
Practice shows that self-defence constitutes an available justification for these collateral 
breaches. To be sure, the practice seldom refers expressly to Article 21 (or its 
predecessor draft Article 34) or uses the language of secondary rules of responsibility. 
Nevertheless, the exonerating effect of self-defence in relation to these collateral 
breaches can be deduced from the findings of international tribunals and the arguments 
of States before them. The present review will primarily focus on judicial practice: courts’ 
decisions as well as States pleadings.166 It is often the case that States’ legal positions are 
more clearly articulated during legal proceedings, where the need to persuade a court of 
the correctness of a State’s position requires a detailed and clear exposition of both facts 
and law. Given the rather nuanced point under examination, brief communications or 
interventions in international fora such as the UN, which tend to mix political and legal 
claims, may prove insufficient or inadequate. The review in this section will consider 
three clusters of obligations, which can be breached collaterally, by self-defensive force: 
(1) the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention; (2) conventional 
commercial obligations; and (3) the legality of maritime exclusion zones.  
 
1. Territorial sovereignty and non-intervention 
Measures of self-defence may (though they need not) occur in the territory of the 
aggressor State. This being so, forcible measures infringe the territorial sovereignty of the 
aggressor State, a principle that constitutes, in the words of the ICJ in Corfu Channel, ‘an 
essential foundation of international relations’.167 Moreover, they may also breach the 
principle of non-intervention, recognised under customary international law.168 From a 
conceptual standpoint, this means that a measure of self-defence, lawful in accordance 
with Article 2(4) and the customary prohibition of force, may still be a breach of the 
territorial sovereignty of the aggressor State and an intervention in its internal affairs. In 
practice, though, no one suggests that a lawful measure of self-defence constitutes a 
breach of these rules of international law. Practice leads, indeed, to the opposite 
conclusion. That lawful self-defence exercised in the territory of the aggressor does not 
constitute a violation of the latter’s sovereignty or an intervention in its affairs can be 
deduced from the parties’ arguments and the judgments in Nicaragua and DRC v Uganda, 
as well as the parties’ arguments in Cameroon v Nigeria. 
 
In the Nicaragua case, Nicaragua argued that by its conduct, including the mining 
and attacks on Nicaraguan ports, the US had violated both the prohibition on the use of 
                                                 
166 Pleadings before international courts and tribunals are generally considered as State practice, see 
International Law Association, ‘Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary 
International Law’ (Report, Committee on Formation of Customary International Law, 2000) 14. See also 
the observations by James Crawford and Alain Pellet at: J Crawford, A Pellet and C Redgwell, ‘Anglo-
American and Continental Traditions in Advocacy before International Courts and Tribunals’ (2013) 2 
CJICL 1, 10-11. 
167 Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 35. 
168 Nicaragua, 107-108 (para 205). 
  26 
force and, separately, its sovereignty through forcible measures of trespass into its 
territory (including its territorial waters and airspace).169 Nicaragua explained that the 
violation of a State’s sovereignty could take place through both forcible and non-forcible 
means so long as there was trespass on the State’s territory. In the instant case, the 
breach of sovereignty had been brought about through measures involving the use of 
force,170 including armed attacks against its territory by land, sea and air.171 Nicaragua later 
clarified that, ‘although the claim based upon violations of sovereignty overlap[ped] with 
other causes of action relating to the use of force’ it did not ‘simply coincide with those 
other causes of action and consequently plays a significant independent role.’172 
 
The Court agreed with Nicaragua. The measures complained of, in addition to 
being acts contrary to the prohibition of force, also constituted breaches of Nicaragua’s 
territorial sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention.173 The Court rejected that 
self-defence precluded the wrongfulness of these breaches because on the facts of the 
case the US did not have a right of self-defence, though it accepted in principle that self-
defence could have justified these violations. 174  This position of principle was also 
explicitly endorsed by some judges in their individual opinions. Thus, Judge Jennings 
stated that the plea of self-defence was ‘obviously a possible justification of 
intervention’, 175  and Judge Schwebel noted that ‘[w]here a State is charged with an 
unlawful use of force, but actually has employed force in self-defence, that State is 
absolved of any breach of its international responsibility’, such that the plea of self-
defence would constitute a complete ‘defence to virtually all Nicaraguan claims’.176 
 
In Cameroon v Nigeria, Nigeria invoked self-defence in response to the claims of 
State responsibility put forward by Cameroon in the context of the territorial and 
maritime delimitation case between the two States. 177  Cameroon claimed that the 
Nigerian military presence in the Bakassi Peninsula and in the Lake Chad area, both areas 
over which Cameroon claimed sovereignty, constituted a breach of ‘the most 
fundamental principles of international law: non-use of force … the principle of non-
intervention, respect for sovereignty.’178 Cameroon’s Memorial, submitted in 1995, also 
addressed possible circumstances precluding wrongfulness which might be invoked by 
Nigeria. In this context, Cameroon referred to self-defence and cited the then draft 
Article 34. The analysis in the memorial centred on Article 51 of the UN Charter, and 
Cameroon denied that the conditions of self-defence were met on the facts with the 
consequence that Nigeria could not rely on this defence for its military measures. In its 
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response to the substance of this claim,179 Nigeria put forward a two-pronged defence.180 
It began by denying that its conduct constituted a breach of the obligations claimed by 
Cameroon insofar as the territory where those acts had occurred belonged to Nigeria. In 
the alternative, Nigeria invoked two circumstances precluding wrongfulness. 181  First, 
Nigeria claimed to be acting in self-defence. 182  Second, should the Court find that 
Cameroon had title over the disputed areas, Nigeria claimed that it had acted pursuant to 
the honest belief that it held sovereignty over the territory and that, in consequence, its 
acts were the product of a reasonable mistake.183 
 
Neither party explicitly stated that the plea of self-defence could act to justify 
alleged breaches of obligations other than the prohibition of force at issue in the case. 
Rather, the understanding that self-defence could justify the breach of those obligations 
seems to have been implicit in the parties’ arguments. In its Memorial, submitted in 1995, 
Cameroon referred to draft Article 34 which, as noted in Section II above, had limited 
the justifying effect of self-defence to a single legal relation (the prohibition of force). 
However there is nothing in Cameroon’s subsequent arguments that would limit, in 
principle, the effect of self-defence to the breach of the prohibition of force only: in its 
subsequent pleadings of 2000 (written reply) and 2002 (oral pleadings), which overlapped 
in time with the ILC’s revision and adoption of Article 21, the argument was presented 
in general terms and, seemingly, in relation to all the claims. To limit the effect of the 
justification of self-defence to the prohibition of force only would certainly have been 
advantageous to Cameroon’s case: even if Nigeria had been found not to have breached 
the prohibition of force due to self-defence, the presence of its troops in Cameroonian 
territory would still constitute a breach of the principles of territorial sovereignty and 
non-intervention thus engaging its responsibility. Yet Cameroon did not limit the plea of 
self-defence in this way. 
 
Nigeria did not cite Article 21 ARS (or draft Article 34 for that matter) either. 
The generality of this justification and its availability in respect of the obligations that 
Cameroon claimed had been breached is implicit in the pleadings. A number of factors, 
both textual and contextual, support this conclusion. To begin with, in the oral pleadings 
in February 2002, Nigeria made the following clarification before the Court about a 
distinction crucial to its argument: 
 
It is the distinction between the absence of a constituent element of a wrongful act, with the result that no 
wrongful act has taken place, and, on the other hand, a defence to State responsibility which applies so as 
to preclude an act, which prima facie constitutes a wrongful act, from giving rise to State responsibility. 184 
 
Self-defence, Nigeria continued, normally belonged to the latter (the circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness).185 It may be recalled that the ILC distinguished between self-
defence as a primary rule, in which case it is an intrinsic exception (or ‘constituent 
element’) of the prohibition of force, and self-defence as a secondary rule, in which case 
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it acts as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. It seems safe to assume that Nigeria’s 
invocation of self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness mirrored the 
understanding of this plea in the ARS. A conclusion that is confirmed by the fact that 
Nigeria, which at several points in its pleadings listed the various obligations Cameroon 
claimed it had violated,186 did not limit its invocation of self-defence to the alleged breach 
of the prohibition of force only.187 
 
An additional contextual factor may further corroborate this conclusion: 
Nigeria’s choice of counsel. As part of Nigeria’s legal team acting before the Court were 
Ian Brownlie and James Crawford. Brownlie had acted as counsel for Nicaragua in the 
case against the US which, as explained above, very clearly articulated the extent of self-
defence as a secondary rule. Crawford, in turn, had been instrumental in adapting Article 
21 in the ARS to its current form in his time as Special Rapporteur for the ILC.188 Of 
course, there is risk in deriving conclusions about counsels’ arguments on behalf of a 
client from arguments in other cases on behalf of other clients or from their scholarly 
work. Counsel are under an (ethical) duty to make the best possible legal case for a client, 
regardless of whether they may agree with this from a personal perspective.189 In this case 
this risk is minimised by the fact that there is consistency of views and that to understand 
self-defence as a justification for the breach of obligations other than the prohibition of 
force was certainly in the best interests of Nigeria, given that Cameroon claimed the 
breach of multiple obligations by Nigeria’s use of military force.  
 
The Court eventually upheld most of Cameroon’s claims over the Bakassi 
Peninsula and the Lake Chad area, though it abstained from deciding on the claims 
concerning State responsibility due to lack of proof.190  
 
In DRC v Uganda the DRC claimed that through its forcible measures, including 
the continued presence of armed forces in the DRC, Uganda had breached the 
prohibition of force and a number of other obligations, including the principle of 
sovereignty and non-intervention.191 Uganda, in response, invoked self-defence to justify 
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the alleged breaches claimed by the DRC.192 Once again, the parties did not explicitly 
assert that the plea of self-defence had been invoked to justify the alleged breaches of the 
various obligations claimed by the DRC. The case was extremely fact intensive, and the 
parties did not dwell at length on the law concerning the circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness. In respect of self-defence, moreover, the majority of the parties’ 
arguments concerned the question of the legality of its exercise against non-state 
actors.193 However, that self-defence could be invoked as a circumstance precluding the 
wrongfulness of the potential breach of obligations other than the prohibition of force is 
again implicit in the pleadings. 
 
As for the DRC, in its Memorial of July 2000 it cited draft Article 34 adopted on 
first reading,194 and referred to this notion as the ‘only’ exception to the prohibition of 
force.195 The Memorial contains several references to Crawford’s Second Report on State 
responsibility in which, as discussed above, he recast the draft provision on self-defence 
as one concerned with legal relations other than the prohibition of force.196 Furthermore, 
tracing the ILC’s work on the matter, the DRC also explicitly excluded that self-defence 
could justify the breach of certain obligations deriving from human rights law and 
humanitarian law (the obligations of ‘total restraint’).197 This express exclusion implies 
that the plea could justify the potential breach of other obligations, in particular those of 
non-intervention and territorial sovereignty that the DRC had invoked. In turn, Uganda, 
whose legal team included Brownlie as counsel, cited Article 21 ARS in its oral 
arguments,198 though it did not discuss the scope of this provision in any detail. The 
respondent did not put forward any specific defences for the alleged breaches of the 
principles of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention that the DRC had claimed, so it 
must have assumed that its plea of self-defence was valid in respect of these allegations 
too. Otherwise, even if the plea of self-defence was found to be successful, it could still 
be found in breach of these obligations. The Court’s judgment did not refer to Article 21 
ARS, though it too seems to have implicitly accepted, at least as a matter of principle, 
that self-defence lawfully exercised would not infringe these other obligations. Thus, 
after finding that self-defence had not been lawfully exercised it held that Uganda had 
breached the prohibition of force and, in addition, the principles of territorial sovereignty 
and non-intervention.199 
 
These cases support the proposition that if forcible measures are adopted in 
accordance with the right of self-defence then they do not constitute breaches of the 
principles of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention either. Indeed, as noted by 
Kimberley Trapp, in addition to excepting conduct from the domain of the prohibition 
of force self-defence must also preclude the infringement of these other obligations. 
Trapp makes this point in the context of self-defence against terrorist actors, in which 
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the conceptual distinction between the prohibition of force and these two principles is 
more visible in that the personal target of the self-defensive force (the terrorist group) is 
different from the geographical location of those measures (the host State). According to 
Trapp, if it is accepted that self-defence may be exercised against a terrorist group located 
in the territory of a third State, then the exercise of that right must also excuse the breach 
of the host State’s territorial integrity.200 Leaving aside the question of the legality of self-
defence against terrorist actors, which is beyond the scope of this paper,201 the principle 
expressed by Trapp is certainly a general one: self-defensive force, as implied by the ICJ 
cases noted above, adopted in accordance with the relevant primary rule does not 
constitute a breach of the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention. 
 
2. Bilateral Treaties of Amity, Commerce and Navigation 
Self-defensive measures may be incompatible with commercial obligations binding on 
the parties to a conflict. This was precisely one of the claims in the Nicaragua case and the 
principal claim in Oil Platforms, where the applicants argued that through forcible 
measures the respondents had breached obligations relating to the freedom of commerce, 
of navigation and of transit under treaty law. 
 
In the Nicaragua case, Nicaragua claimed that the mining of, and attack on, the 
ports of Corinto, Puerto Sandino and El Bluff, the principal Nicaraguan ports which 
together handled almost all of its trade, constituted a breach of the freedom of 
commerce and navigation as well as the freedom of transit protected under Articles 
XIX(1) and XX of the 1956 US-Nicaragua Treaty of Amity respectively.202 Nicaragua 
recognised that these breaches could be justified under the ‘exonerating causes 
traditionally recognised under customary law and enumerated in Chapter V’ of the ARS 
adopted on first reading, including self-defence which had already been invoked by the 
US in the counter-memorial on jurisdictional objections. However, it argued that the plea 
was not met in fact.203 In so doing, Nicaragua was acknowledging that had the measures 
been a lawful exercise of self-defence, there would have been no violation of the 1956 
Treaty or of the relevant customary rules. The Court accepted this position in principle, 
though it agreed with Nicaragua and rejected the plea on the facts: having concluded that 
the US’s claim of self-defence was unfounded, this plea could not justify the treaty 
breaches either.204 
 
The Oil Platforms case concerned the breach of various provisions of the 1955 
Iran-US Treaty of Amity through the attacks carried out by the US on offshore oil 
complexes, owned for commercial purposes by the National Iranian Oil Corporation.205 
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In particular, Iran argued that the attacks on the platforms constituted a breach of article 
X(1) of the Treaty, pursuant to which ‘[b]etween the territories of the High Contracting 
Parties there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation.’206 In response to the claim, 
the US relied, among others, on the plea of self-defence. As part of its defence, the US 
relied on the essential security exception under Article XX(1) of the Treaty of Amity and, 
alternatively, on self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. Invoking the 
recently adopted Article 21 ARS, the US argued that its measures were a lawful exercise 
of self-defence and, as such, self-defence justified the alleged breach of the 1955 Treaty. 
Indeed ‘[a]ny actions of the US deemed incompatible with Article X of the Treaty would 
not be wrongful by the operation of this principle of customary international law.’207 
 
The US later modified this argument during the oral pleadings of the case. Its 
revised forensic strategy was to characterise the Treaty of Amity as a self-contained 
regime, thus excluding from the Court’s jurisdiction any consideration of general 
international law. US counsel explained at length how Article XX(1)(d) constituted a lex 
specialis, with the consequence that, consistently with Article 55 ARS, this provision 
excluded the applicability to the dispute under the Treaty of the circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness of the (general) law of State responsibility. The US was erecting a ring 
fence between the dispute before the Court and general international law: the self-
contained character of the Treaty excluded consideration of the law on the use of force; 
the ‘special’ character of the defence in Article XX(1)(d) thus excluded consideration of 
self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness. 208  This change of argument 
notwithstanding, not only did the US not reject in its oral pleadings ARS Article 21 as a 
matter of principle, but its insistence that Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty constituted a lex 
specialis excluding the application of Article 21 can only be evidence that, absent the lex 
specialis, Article 21 would have been applicable as lex generalis. 
 
Iran, in turn, while denying that the plea was met on the facts, agreed with the 
statement of principle in the American argument: 
 
[A]ction otherwise lawfully taken in self-defence could constitute a circumstance precluding wrongfulness 
in relation to Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty. In other words, it accepts the proposition contained in 
Article 21 of the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of States. There is no express stipulation to that effect 
in the 1955 Treaty, but there does not need to be. If the US was acting in self-defence in attacking and 
destroying or attempting to destroy the platforms, then Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty is not one of 
the ‘obligations of total restraint’ of which [the Court] spoke in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 
Freedom of commerce may suffer when action is taken in self-defence; it is not an ‘intransgressible’ 
value.209 
 
Iran later added that, if made out, self-defence would ‘exonerate the United States 
entirely; it would provide a complete justification for their conduct, in accordance with 
Article 21 of the ILC’s Articles.’210 
 
 Unfortunately the Court failed to grasp the role of the plea of self-defence in the 
case. Instead of applying self-defence as a circumstance precluding wrongfulness, the 
Court chose to interpret the treaty-based exception in light of other relevant rules of 
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international law applicable between the parties, pursuant to Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,211 which included the law of self-defence.212 
This choice was harshly criticised by members of the Court, who viewed it as an 
incorporation in toto of the law on the use of force into the Treaty and, as such, an undue 
extension of the Court’s jurisdiction under the compromissory clause of the 1955 
Treaty.213 Had the Court understood the role of self-defence as a circumstance precluding 
the wrongfulness of the treaty breaches, it would have been able to consider this plea as a 
rule of the general law of State responsibility without straying outside the jurisdictional 
boundaries imposed by the compromissory clause.214 Nevertheless, from the standpoint 
of State practice what is relevant for present purposes is that both parties before the 
Court invoked Article 21 as applicable to the treaty breaches at issue in the case and, at 
least as a matter of principle, understood the correct role of self-defence as a 
circumstance precluding the wrongfulness of collateral breaches of self-defensive force. 
 
3. Maritime exclusion zones 
Natalie Klein points out that in the context of military operations at sea during armed 
conflict: 
 
One of the essential principles … is that neutral shipping is not to be denied the freedom of navigation on 
the high seas. Rights of innocent passage, transit passage, and archipelagic sea lanes passage are all 
maintained for neutral shipping, as well as for belligerent vessels through neutral waters.215  
 
The institution of war zones at sea, as areas in which States parties to conflict claim ‘to 
be entitled to restrict the freedom of navigation and/or aviation of other States’, 216 
evidently may affect these rights. The legality of these zones, especially when they extend 
to the high seas, is uncertain.217 Self-defence has been invoked to justify the potential 
breach of the freedom of the high seas by the institution of these zones. Although these 
zones may affect the rights of the aggressor and of third parties, the analysis will be 
limited to the relations between the two parties to the conflict. 
 
The legality of military maritime zones was at issue in the 1982 
Falklands/Malvinas conflict. 218  In April 1982, following the Argentine attack on the 
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islands, the UK instituted a 200 nautical mile exclusion zone around the 
Falklands/Malvinas directed at Argentine warships and naval auxiliaries, 219  eventually 
extended to within 12 nautical miles of the Argentine coast,220 with the aim of facilitating 
military operations.221 The zone was later extended to Argentine merchant vessels and 
aircraft as well.222 Additionally, the UK declared a so-called ‘defensive bubble’ around its 
naval task force, which was sailing across the Atlantic towards the islands, directed to all 
(including third party) warships and military and civilian aircraft.223 The UK justified its 
measures on the basis of self-defence. 224  Other than Argentina (the target of the 
measures),225 only the USSR officially protested the institution of the maritime zones on 
the basis that they breached the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas,226 since they 
prevented the freedom of navigation on the high seas.227 Despite this protest, the UK’s 
measures during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict were largely accepted as lawful because 
they were ‘adopted for self-defence purposes’.228 
 
 War zones were also proclaimed during the Iran/Iraq conflict of 1980-1988, 
leading to what came to be known as the ‘tanker war’. On September 1980, Iran declared 
war zones near Iranian shores and it stated that it would not allow merchant cargo 
shipping to Iraq. It also designated safe shipping routes. On October of that same year, 
Iraq declared the zone of the Persian Gulf north of 29º 03’ a war zone prohibited to all 
shipping, expanding this zone again in 1982 and 1984 (around the Kharg Island).229 It 
appears that at the time neither State justified its institution of the zones on grounds of 
self-defence,230 though as noted below Iran would later justify their legality as an incident 
of its right of self-defence. In contrast to the maritime zones established by the UK in 
the Malvinas/Falklands conflict, the ‘tanker war’ affected neutral shipping.231 The zones 
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established in the Persian Gulf were ultimately condemned by the UN Security Council232 
and several States233 as a violation of the freedom of the high seas. The condemnation, 
however, was mostly a reaction to the indiscriminate nature of attacks on neutral 
shipping carried out by both parties. While States seemed ready to accept that, pursuant 
to the law of armed conflict, parties to a conflict may interfere with neutral shipping for 
the purpose of searching for contraband,234 indiscriminate attacks could not be justified 
on this basis. 
 
At the time, neither party referred to self-defence in justification of the war zones 
in the Gulf. The argument of self-defence in relation to the zones was made by the UK 
in a statement of 1986. Consistently with the position maintained during the 
Malvinas/Falklands conflict, a Foreign Office Minister stated before the British 
parliament that: 
 
The UK upholds the general principle of the freedom of navigation of the high seas. However, under 
Article 51 of the UN Charter, a State such as Iran actively engaged in armed conflict, is entitled in exercise 
of its inherent right of self-defence to stop and search a foreign merchant ship on the high seas if there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting that the ship is taking arms to the other side of use in the conflict. This 
is an exceptional right …235 
 
This statement was later referred to by Iran in its pleadings in the Oil Platforms case in 
support of the legality of its war zones in the Persian Gulf. In the course of its pleadings, 
Iran explained that ‘it was justified in asserting a right of visit and search, as an incident 
of its broader right of self-defence’ and that this was recognised by ‘several States’, 
pointing to the UK’s statement.236 
 
After a thorough review of practice and literature on this question, Christian 
Michaelsen comes to the conclusion that ‘the establishment of maritime exclusion zones 
seems to be legally acceptable only in circumstances of self-defence … or when expressly 
authorised by the Security Council’.237 Put otherwise, the collateral breach of the freedom 
and peaceful purposes of the seas by maritime zones adopted in the exercise of the right 
self-defence is precluded, vis-à-vis the aggressor State, because of the circumstance of self-
defence. The same seems to be applicable in regard to forcible measures adopted at sea 
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which affect enemy vessels: to the extent that they are taken for the purpose of self-
defence, they do not infringe the guarantee of the peaceful purposes of the sea.238  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Contemporary international law no longer recognises a distinction between the legal 
status of war and the legal status of peace. When States resort to force, as the ILC put it, 
they do so while formally at peace.239 Thus, force occurs against the background of the 
complex web of legal relations which bind the States involved (and third States as well). 
This means that the use of force, in addition to potentially infringing the prohibition of 
force, can also breach multiple obligations owed by the State resorting to force to its 
victim. As clearly stated by the ICJ in Oil Platforms, in general, international obligations 
may be breached through any means: be it a legislative act, a decision of a court, or a use 
of force.240 The ICJ’s case-law (and case-load) on this point is rather extensive: in over 20 
cases filed before the Court the applicant’s argument concerned the violation of its rights 
by uses of force of the respondent State. Of course, very often these claims are the 
consequence of the limits on the Court’s jurisdiction, which can only often be found only 
in compromissory clauses in treaties thus requiring the applicant to claim a breach of that 
very treaty. Nevertheless, it remains the case that States claim (or respond to claims for) 
the breach of obligations brought about through the use of armed force. 
 
The frequency of such claims renders the correct understanding of the scope of 
Article 21, codifying the secondary rule function of self-defence, rather pressing. A State 
acting in self-defence is ‘not even potentially’ in breach of the prohibition of force; self-
defence is an intrinsic element of the prohibition of force, such that the prohibition does 
not extend to cover self-defensive force. As a result, no breach of the prohibition can 
occur by the exercise of self-defensive force. But this use of force, lawful as it may be 
under one rule of international law, may be unlawful under another rule of international 
law. It does not appear that every other rule of international law is equally intrinsically 
limited by the circumstance of self-defence. This is, to be sure, a theoretical possibility—
every obligation could contain an ‘except in the case of self-defence’ condition, excluding 
their application in cases where self-defence is exercised—but positive law does not seem 
to endorse such an approach. The obligations collaterally breached are all conceptually 
distinct from the obligation not to use force in international relations, and the breach of 
any one of these rules is also conceptually distinct from the breach of any of the other 
rules.241 Accordingly, a condition or qualification to any one of these rules only has no 
effect on the breach of any of the other rules. If the right of self-defence (the relevant 
primary rule) constitutes an implicit condition of the prohibition on the use of force only, 
the legality of the forcible measure pursuant to that rule does not of necessity affect the 
(un)lawfulness of that same conduct under the principles of territorial sovereignty, non-
intervention, freedom of the seas, the guarantee of freedom of commerce, and so on. 
Lawful self-defensive action, in short, can still be unlawful under other rules of 
international law. 
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Yet, the review of practice undertaken in this study shows that, even if only 
implicitly and only in principle, States as well as the ICJ accept that lawful self-defensive 
force does not constitute a breach of (certain) other obligations binding the States in 
conflict. As the previous paragraph noted, this effect cannot be attributed to self-defence 
in its function as a primary rule of international law. It must then be the case that self-
defence performs also another function in international law: that of justifying collateral 
breaches. This is best seen as an incidental function, much in the way that preclusion of 
wrongfulness is an incidental function of countermeasures. The review here was limited 
to the effects of self-defence on the principles of territorial sovereignty and non-
intervention, conventional commercial obligations, and some obligations in the law of 
the sea. Save for the exceptions indicated in the ILC’s Commentary to Article 21, the so-
called obligations of ‘total restraint’, there is nothing that in principle would prevent the 
extension of self-defence’s exonerating effect to other obligations beyond these ones. 
For example, there is nothing to prevent the application of Article 21 to the forcible 
breach of treaties for the exchange of technology or other treaties for the exchange of 
goods or services. 
 
To be sure, this incidental function of self-defence has not been thus far clearly 
articulated in most instances. With the exception of the parties in Oil Platforms, in every 
other case it appears that the mere invocation of the right of self-defence carries with it 
the assumption that the exercise of this right will also justify collateral breaches of at least 
some obligations. Perhaps it is for this reason that it has remained unarticulated in States’ 
pleadings and the ICJ’s decisions. It remains to be seen whether the clarification of the 
scope of Article 21 will result in clear and direct invocations of this provision, thus 
further clarifying the extent of the defence (namely, what are the limits of self-defence’s 
function as a justification) and its role in the international order. 
 
Finally, an important question, left open by the ILC, was that of the effect of 
self-defensive force on third States.242 Unlike in respect of countermeasures,243 the ILC 
did not affirm that self-defensive force which infringes the rights of third parties (as 
opposed to their interest) may not be justified by reference to the self-defensive aim of 
the action. The case-law analysed does not provide any indication of development in this 
regard, probably as a result of the Court’s jurisdiction, though there seems to be growing 
acceptance of self-defensive interference with neutral shipping. The institution of 
maritime zones on the high seas and the use of forcible measures in this area, in the 
exercise of self-defence, may occasionally affect the rights of third parties, as the brief 
review of practice showed. The legality of these interferences has been widely debated, 
and a range of views exists on the point.244 According to the most restrictive view, only 
self-defence could justify the infringement of third party rights at sea.245 It is hoped, 
nevertheless, that this expansion of self-defence’s justifying function beyond the relations 
between belligerents is exceptional and that, as with countermeasures, it is clarified that 
forcible violations of third-party rights are not, and should not, be tolerated by the 
international legal order. 
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